on comparative legislative representation tends to favor PR over SMD, there is less
academic consensus on the relative merits of individualistic vs. collective represen-
tation (Golden and Chang 2001 ; Persson and Tabellini 2003 ). This is an area that
ought to attract substantial attention among scholars of comparative legislatures.
3 Deliberation
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Once representatives, of whatever type, are selected, they must establish procedures
to consider alternative policy proposals. In this instance, legislative process is very
much a part of the product; democratic legislatures arepublicforums of debate
and deliberation. What is the relevance ofpublic-ness? Adherents of deliberative
democracy contend that public debate is characterized by norms that limit admis-
sible arguments on behalf of proposals in ways that contribute to the public good.
- 1 Elevating the Debate
Imagine there are two types of policy available, those that serve the general public
good, and those that serve the good of some actors at the expense of others. In a
closed decision process I might pursue—via my proposals, my coalition-building
eVorts, my vote, etc.—either type of outcome. The deliberative democracy claim is
that public debate constrains me from pursuing the latter type (Goodin 1986 ). As
David Miller ( 1993 ) puts it, ‘‘To be seen to be engaged in political debate we must
argue in terms that any other participant could potentially accept, and ‘It’s good for
me’ is not such an argument.’’ The central implication is that, by placing decisions
over public policy in a public forum, legislatures elevate the public goods character
of the set of policies that can be supported, thereby improving policy outcomes.
How might this elevation come about? First, per the deliberative democracy
claim, it may be that only public-serving proposals can be defended in public. A less
demanding scenario would divide policy proposals into those that serve only
politicians and those that serve some segment of the general public. Even if
norms of public debate are less constraining than the deliberative democracy
position would have it, fear of electoral or other punishment by citizens may still
make politicians unwilling to support public policies that serveonlythemselves.
Thus, whether norms of debate or punishment by citizens are the key mechanism,
the public-ness of legislative decision-making would appear to be a public good.
438 john m. carey