come from some other source. Groups must be able to oVer things of value to
contributorsand only to contributors—selective beneWts, not collective beneWts.
The group objective isWnanced, therefore, as abyproductof bribing individuals
to contribute with private compensation.
One of the earliest responses to Olson’s classic was a book review by Wagner
( 1966 ). There he pointed out a glaring omission in the byproduct logic of Olson’s
theory of collective action—namely, the role of leadership. (Also see Frohlich,
Oppenheimer, and Young 1971 .) Wagner suggested that even Olson’s byproduct
logic must have some source of implementation. Inventing the term political
entrepreneur, he argued that particular individuals may make unusually large
contributions of time and energy andWnancial and (especially) logistical resources
not (only) because they care passionately about the group’s objective but
(also) because they see an opportunity to parlay this investment into something
personally (read: selectively) rewarding. It is no surprise, for example, when a
congressman from south Florida (home to many retirees) provides political lead-
ership on issues beneWting the elderly—the electoral connection supplies the ex-
planation (whether the congressman is personally passionate about these issues or
not). Likewise, it is surely not entirely explained by ‘‘generosity of spirit’’ when a
young lawyer takes on a cause—say, the lead-poisoning of inner city infants—even
though there may be no immediate remuneration. Applying the career concerns
logic just suggested about the congressman, this political entrepreneur takes lead-
ership of an issue in order to advance a personal agenda (of whichWnding a solution
to the issue at hand may be part, but only part), possibly parlaying his public spirit
into a political career, a network of contacts, future remuneration for his legal
practice, etc. The leadership explanation is not entirely compelling in all settings.
But it invites us to scrutinize some of the less obvious motives of those who assume
the mantle of leadership. (On the rational choice analysis of leadership more
generally, see Fiorina and Shepsle 1989 ; and Shepsle and Bonchek 1997 , ch. 14 .)
A feature of all collective action from a purely rational perspective is that
outcomes are not Pareto optimal. Everyone would be better oVif there were some
way to coerce contributions. Selective beneWts and political entrepreneurs are two of
the most important contributions of rational choice institutionalism to an appre-
ciation of solutions to collective action phenomena. Leadership, in fact, may be
interpreted as giving some agent the authority to wield carrots and sticks—that is,
provide selective incentives—to induce contributions to group objectives and thus
move the collectivity onto the Pareto surface. (Indeed, this is a rough approximation
of arguments made centuries ago by Hobbes and Hume to justify the existence of
the state. Generally, see Buchanan and Tullock 1962 ;Hardin 1982 ; Sandler 1992 .)
A third ‘‘solution’’ to the problem of collective action is best understood in the
problem writ small—the problem ofcooperation. Axelrod ( 1984 ) paved the way to
understanding how to get individuals to seize a cooperation dividend, rather
than leaving it on the table, by examining repeated prisoners’ dilemma (PD)
rational choice institutionalism 31