among the various coalitions that might form, and could—and some did—even
condition their vote on those preferences over coalition governments rather than
parties (Blais, Aldrich, Indridiason, and Levine forthcoming). But, the break in
accountability is that there is little Sharon could do to bind himself to any promise
about what sort of government would form and thus the range of policies he would
make as prime minister. Therefore, voters could not really hold Likud or anyone
else accountable on those grounds. In the event, the most popular coalition in the
public view was rejected by Labor, and Sharon successfully formed a governing
coalition consisting of an entirely diVerent coalition than the ones considered in
the campaign. There are no data about public preferences on this coalition, because
no survey researcher imagined including it as a possible coalition, but it is
reasonable to assume that it probably would have proved unpopular had it been
considered in and by the public. The central lesson of this example is that
accountability suVers dramatically. Post-election circumstances might, at least on
occasion, force the selection of someone to be prime minister who deviates sharply
from public opinion and perhaps even from the basis of voters’ decisions. Even
more commonly, negotiations over coalition governments might well force the
outcome to be a government—and consequent set of policies—that diVers sharply
from the choices and preferences of the public.
In sum, both two- and multiparty systems generate problems over represen-
tation. This is true in terms of representation in two senses. It is true in interest
articulation. That is, even the purest PR systems fail to create legislatures that
mirror the preferences of the public, and this bias is systematic rather than
random. It is also true in terms of accountability. Voters who wanted a Labor–
Likud coalition in national unity could hardly hold Sharon and Likud, as
winners of the election, accountable for Labor’s refusal (announced during the
campaign) to agree to enter any such coalition. And as it happens, they could
not easily hold them accountable for the failure of hisWrst coalition government,
since it was replaced early in the electoral cycle. If there is going to be any voting
on the basis of accountability (a.k.a. retrospective voting), it presumably will be
based in the next election on the second, the lasting, and the more recent
coalition.
In both two-party and multiparty coalition cases, then, the question is who or
what can be held responsible? In the extreme US case, voters can basically hold
their representatives accountable for failures to be responsive to their wishes, but
not for failure to be responsible for the outcomes. In other two-party systems,
voters can hold the majority party accountable, but typically only for failure to
achieve a set of policies that the voters might have thought was not very close to
their views in theWrst place. In the general multiparty case, one might hold a
Sharon and Likud responsible (and if so, perhaps realistically, could turn to Labor
as, in this case, the only responsible alternative), but who or what else? The party
you voted for? The parties in the government?
560 john h. aldrich