have a more sociological, constitutive understanding of international institution-
alism. Esoteric as this might seem, it casts long policy shadows.
If, within a sociological context, we see international organization as institu-
tionalized international relations, then we might conclude by saying that there
appears not to be a strong correlation between the volume of international
organizational activity and its ability to deal eVectively and eYciently with the
large issues in international relations. The strong still operate outside the borders of
organizational norms when it suits them. This is especially the case with regards to
war and military conXict (such as the US-led invasion of Iraq). To this extent, if
realist theory is principally about the interests of the powerful it seems diYcult to
brook its assertions about the irrelevance of international institutions (Mearshei-
mer 1994 – 5 ). But as Simmons and Martin ask ( 2002 , 195 ), if realism was the
sole form of reasoning in international relations then it would not explain
why the United States spent so much of the second half of the twentieth
century underwriting the principles of international organization. Even for
realists—policy-makers more than theorists it needs to be added—IOs still fulWll
important functions. Even realists cooperate.
We do not have to accept the ‘‘end of globalism’’ literature (Ralston Saul 2005 )to
recognize the manner in which a range of events have curtailed enthusiasm for
international organization in major quarters. It is not an axiomatic assumption at
the beginning of the twenty-Wrst century that an expanded role for international
organization in this era is assured. The crisis in the role of the UN Security Council
in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, the failure of the USA to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol and to sign on to the International Criminal Court, are testament to the
need to be context speciWc and time speciWc in our judgments of the salience of
IOs. Constraints on the further development of the EU in the wake of the abortive
constitution also bear witness to the limitations of regional projects to advance
beyond certain stages. These judgments give rise to the question, ‘‘where now in the
theory and practice of international organization?’’
Research on international organization in the early twenty-Wrst century will
axiomatically be embedded within the wider study of global governance and
particularly the degree to which international organizations can bridge the
gap between their abilities to provide eVective and eYcient decision-making
underwritten by the best technical expertise on the one hand and the ability of
international organizations to legitimate their actions on the other. The key issues
in any future research agenda therefore will revolve around issues of institutional
reform, great power commitment, and questions of organizational/institutional
legitimacy. Empirically, the focus of research will stay on the major organizations—
the UN, the EU, and important emerging regional actors.
It is diYcult to disaggregate theory from practice in any future research agenda.
In the UN context, for example, no one denies the need for reform nor the key
elements of an institutional reform agenda—from adjusting the Security Council
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