relatively easy to solve (Stein 1982 ). A new focus on how institutions might aid in
resolving coordination problems has added depth to our understanding of IOs’
functions (Morrow 1994 ; Oatley and Nabors 1998 ).
In the 1990 s, the theory of international institutions became deeper and richer.
Ruggie and Keohane brought the concept of multilateralism back into the study of
institutions. Keohane ( 1990 )deWned multilateralism simply, as cooperation among
three or more states, while Ruggie ( 1992 ) conceptualized multilateralism as a set of
norms that prescribed certain patterns of behavior, such as non-discrimination.
Both served to redirect attention to variation among types of institutions, a highly
productive move for theWeld. Another debate arose regarding the problem
of compliance with the rules of IOs and with international agreements more
generally. A managerial school, representing primarily the views of legal scholars,
argued that states generally wanted to comply with international rules, and that
variation in compliance was therefore not a compelling puzzle (Chayes and Chayes
1993 ). Political scientists responded by noting that the managerial argument was
plagued by selection bias: if states almost always complied with the rules, it was
likely because they would only accept rules that demanded minimal changes in
their patterns of behavior. The appropriate question, therefore, was not so much
compliance as how diVerent structures of rules would promote far-reaching
changes in behavior that left states open to exploitation, or ‘‘deep cooperation’’
(Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996 ). Interestingly, both the managerial and
contractual schools agreed on the conclusion that variation in patterns of compli-
ance was not a terribly important or interesting question, although they came to
this conclusion by diVerent paths. The managerial school argued that little
variation in compliance could be observed because states are obliged to comply.
The formal analysis of compliance argued that minimal observed variation in
compliance simply reXected the fact that states are unlikely to make commitments
on which they intend to renege. Nevertheless, empirical research on variation in
compliance has continued, leading to some intriguingWndings (Brown Weiss and
Jacobson 1998 ; Simmons 2000 ).
Other theoretical developments focus on the form and design of IOs. One body of
work asks why IOs are becoming more ‘‘legalized:’’ They more often incorporate
legalistic features such as third-party dispute settlement (Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane,
and Slaughter 2000 ). Researchers have begun to explore the advantages and possible
disadvantages of legalization for promoting international cooperation. Another
body of work focuses on design principles for IOs. Starting from the assumption
that IOs are designed to resolve collective-action problems, analysts have derived a
number of hypotheses about the form of IOs (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001 ).
For example, if states design an IO to reduce the transaction costs of monitoring
members’ behavior, we would expect the organization to have relatively centralized
monitoring capacities. Using logic like this, dimensions of IOs such as their central-
ization and autonomy from member states can be explained. David Lake ( 1996 )
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