by a popular referendum. The revolutionary constitutions in France (since 1792 )
and in the United States (in 1787 ) did not completely break with the institutions of
the pre-revolutionary regime, but adapted them to the needs of representative—
and later when universal suVrage was accepted—democratic government. Consti-
tutions by the conservatives of the early nineteenth century were considered as
‘‘revolutionary institutions.’’ But under the threat of revolution various forms of
adaptation of this institution by the existing monarchies took place. Constitutions
were either imposed by monarchs (octroi), as the Piedmontese ‘‘Statuto Albertino’’
of 1849 which was to become the constitution of the kingdom of Italy, or negotiated
by legislatures and monarchs (France 1792 , Spain 1810 , and in many European
territories after 1815 ). Even dictatorships normally adapted some kind of constitu-
tion, including a bill of rights which the regime rarely respected.
Old assemblies of ‘‘estates’’ were transformed intomodern parliaments, some-
times as late as 1866 in Sweden. Various forms of advisers to the crown developed
into amodern cabinetwith a ‘‘prime minister.’’ Important institutional changes were
grounded not so much in the internal change of institutions, but in their mutual
relationship within the system. The major institutional innovation was the devel-
opment of dependence of cabinets on the conWdence of parliamentary majorities
over almost one century. It happened in systems with continuity of former estate
systems (Britain,Wnal conXict 1832 , Netherlands 1868 , Sweden 1917 ). New institu-
tions were created by new revolutionary systems which establishedparliamentary
responsibility of governments(France and Belgium 1831 ). Parliamentarization of
neoabsolutist regimes was normally late—with the exception of Italy ( 1860 ).
The latest latecomers in this group were Germany and Austria ( 1918 ). Parliamen-
tarization did not evolve in harmony with the extension of voting rights.SuVragein
theWrst parliamentary systems on the continent was hardly above 1 – 2 percent.
Germany introduced universal suVrage as early as 1871 , but full parliamentary
responsibility of governments followed only in 1918 (von Beyme 2000 , 28 ).
Most regimes in the nineteenth century were dualistic constitutional monarch-
ies. Revolutions which led to a republican system—as in France in 1848 ,in
Germany and Finland in 1918 —tried toWnd a republican equivalent for a system
with a president elected by popular vote and not depending on parliamentary
majorities. Only in the Fifth French Republic was this type of government dubbed a
‘‘semi-presidential regime.’’ Frequently it evolved in a constitution making process
with extensive debates on the virtues of the American ‘‘presidential system.’’ Finally
a European compromise led to a hybrid of parliamentary systems in which the
prime minister and the cabinet depended on parliamentary votes and the president
was equipped with the right to dissolve parliament as a counterweight against
permanently hostile legislative majorities (von Beyme 1987 ,33V).
Two major institutions had existed already in Ancient Rome but developed into
powerful organizations which penetrated the whole life of society: bureaucracy
and parties. Bureaucracy for Max Weber was the dominant institution of
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