between ‘‘diVusionists’’ who thought that social institutions developed from one
center to other areas (Thor Heyerdal even tried to demonstrate the possibility of
diVusion of institutions by imitating boat trips from Polynesia to South America)
and ‘‘functionalists’’—prevailing in America—who considered the development of
social institutions rather as the result of social needs which led to functional
equivalents of rather similar institutions. The political debate in the North Atlantic
world was, however, more diVusionist than in the realm of cultures preserving only
oral traditions. ‘‘Institutional engineering’’ in political systems relied on a huge bulk
of constitutional models and political theories which shaped them. Conscious
adaptations of foreign institutions merged with national traditions since the belief
that national institutions ‘‘grow’’ out of national traditions—widely accepted by
conservative parties in the nineteenth century—was withering away.
The USA never shared the cult of the state as a major institution. Nevertheless
the citizens were more proud of their institutions than in other countries. The
study by Almond and Verba ( 1963 , 102 ) found that 85 percent of Americans were
proud of their institutions, but only 46 percent of British, 7 percent of Germans,
and 3 percent of Italians. Already one of theWrst European evaluations of the
American system, by Lord Bryce ( 1888 / 1959 , vol. 1 , 1 ) was puzzled by a typical
American question, ‘‘What do you think of our institutions?’’ which he never heard
in Britain. American preference for institutions was explained by the lack of a cult
of personality and monarchical symbolism.
- 3 Institutional Crises and the Para-theories of Institutions
Later theories had to cope with the fact that attitudes towards institutions are not
permanent features of some kind of ‘‘national character.’’ Periodical crises of
national institutions inspired less the creation of new institutions than the devel-
opment of new theories on institutions. Most of them hardly deserved the term
‘‘theory’’ and weread hoc generalizationswhich did not survive in long-term
developments. Crisis-mongering leads to much discussed bestsellers in the intel-
lectual sphere which contributed at best para-theories. Cycles of corruption and
unlawful practices can undermine basic conWdence in the institutions.
Huntington ( 1981 , 4 ) found a general gap between ideal and institutions—the
so-called IvI gap—as ‘‘a peculiarly American form of cognitive dissonance.’’ The
message was not without hope in post-Watergate America. Ideals of the American
creed periodically purify and revitalize American institutions. In other countries
another crisis of institutions was criticized. The scenarios were frequently even
more pessimistic. New institutions seemed to undermine the old constitutionally
guaranteed institutions. The ‘‘new social movements’’ caused fear and misgivings.
They may have been centered in Berkeley, Paris, or Berlin, but they spread all over
the world and formed loose revolutionary networks.
political institutions—old and new 751