predictive science of politics is possible. Yet whether its clear superiority to other
contending positions has already been, or is ever likely to be, established, is another
matter. Blyth’s concluding remarks are, in this respect, particularly problematic. The
purpose of his book, he suggests, is ‘‘to demonstrate that large-scale institutional
change cannot be understood from class alignments, materially given coalitions, or
other structural prerequisites.... [I]nstitutional change only makes sense by refer-
ence to the ideas that inform agents’ responses to moments of uncertainty and crisis’’
( 2002 , 251 ). This is a bold and almost certainly overstated claim. For, rather than
demonstrating that structural prerequisites cannot inform a credible account of
institutional change, constructivist institutionalism is perhaps better seen as dem-
onstrating that alternative and compelling accounts can be constructed that do not
restrict themselves to such material factors. Moreover, Blyth here seems to drive
something of a wedge between the consideration of ideational and material factors in
causal analysis. This is unfortunate, because as he at times seems quite happy to
concede, there are almost certainly (some) material conditions of existence of
ascendant crisis narratives and crises themselves would seem to have both material
and ideational determinants. Ideational factors certainly need to be given greater
attention, but surely not at the expense of all other variables.
4 Conclusion
.........................................................................................................................................................................................
As the above paragraphs hopefully suggest, whilst constructivist institutionalism
has much to contribute to the analysis and, above all, the explanation of complex
institutional change, it is still very much a work in progress. Its particular appeal
resides in its ability to interrogate and open up the often acknowledged and yet
rarely explored question of institutional dynamics under disequilibrium condi-
tions. As a consequence of this focus, it has already gone some way to overcoming
the new institutionalism’s characteristic failure to deal adequately with post-
formative institutional change and its tendency toWnd it rather easier to describe
(and, even more so, to explain) path-dependent as opposed to path-shaping logics.
Yet, in so doing, it has stumbled over other problems. In particular, it seems unclear
whether constructivist institutionalists are prepared to abandon altogether the long
association of interests and material factors in political analysis that they ostensibly
challenge. Similarly, the extent to which constructivist institutionalism entails the
substitution of material by ideational explanations, the development of explan-
ations which dissolve the dualistic distinction between the two, or merely the
addition of ideational variables to pre-existing material accounts remains unclear.
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