aim was only to defend the revolution against its enemies. In May
1790, the Assembly proclaimed: “the French nation renounces the
undertaking of any war with a view to making conquests, and it will
never use its forces against the liberty of any people.”^27 Initially, even
the annexation of adjacent territories where there was strong popular
support for the Revolution, such as Nice and Savoy, seemed objec-
tionable to revolutionaries fearful of a policy of conquest. Gradually,
however, the doctrine of France’s “natural frontier” and the idea of
granting “fraternity and aid to all peoples who wish to recover their
liberty” displaced these initial doubts.^28 The French armies “saw
themselves not as conquerors but as liberators, at the service of a
universal ideal of liberty, equality, and fraternity,” and in many
regions of Europe they were indeed welcomed by republican forces.^29
With Napole ́on’scoup d’e ́tatin 1799, this revolutionary impulse
was stopped. Authoritarianism prevailed over democracy, liberation
gave way to plunder and conquest, and reforms outside France were
imposed rather than enabled.^30 By 1812, Napole ́on had created an
empire that covered most of Europe. Two years later, this over-
extended empire was defeated, and a new world order was fashioned,
primarily by the United Kingdom, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.^31
From then on, the monarchies of Europe stressed the need to prevent
revolution and disorder, and put forward their own worldview,
anchored in the conventional notions of reason of state and balance of
power. In 1830, Austria’s State Chancellor, Metternich, succinctly
summarized the dominant ideology of his times: “In no epoch of
modern history has society been presented with more dangers than in
the present, because of the upheaval in France. The true...and last
anchor left for the welfare of Europe lies in the understanding between
(^27) Quoted in George Rude ́,Revolutionary Europe, 1783–1815, London, Fontana
28 Press, 1964, p. 208.
29 Ibid., p. 210.
Robert Gildea,Barricades and Borders; Europe 1800–1914, third edition,
30 Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 53.
Ibid., pp. 35–36; Michael Howard,War in European History, Oxford
University Press, 1976, p. 82; Rude ́,Revolutionary Europe, 1783–1815,
31 pp. 214–15.
G. John Ikenberry,After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the
Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton University Press, 2001,
pp. 80–85.
The rise of the modern state system (1776–1945) 91