In the late twentieth century, many historians of science turned toward a more “ externalist ” sociological
understanding of science, in preference to “ internalist ” studies of the evolution of certain concepts within the
confines of its environing discipline. Turning away from the presumption of objectivity or impersonality, the
sociological approach treats scientific research as all-too-human, never “ pure, ” driven by such social forces as
affect other human endeavors (thus, e.g., Shapin 1994 , 2010 ). Precisely through its intermediary character, music
bridges these “ inside ” and “ outside ” views of natural philosophy.
Such an endeavor would consult, revise, and transcend Edmund Husserl ’ s initiatives, applied in Klein 1985 ,
65 – 84. Among recent efforts to reengage these larger connections, see Daston and Galison 2007. Concerning
the synthetic vocation of the history of science, see Holton 2009.
The story about his operatic experience is related by his biographer William Stukeley, cited in Gouk 1999 ,
In the vast literature on “ scientific revolution(s), ” note especially the thoughtful work of Cohen 1994, 2010,
which complements his classic treatment of music in Cohen 1984. Note also the thoughtful reinterpretation of
“ presentism ” in Oreskes 2013, which seems to me to make important distinctions.
Thus, I leave aside those (such as Christiaan Huygens) mainly occupied with making music into a science,
which Cohen (1984 , 205 – 230) has treated so well, and as Kassler (1995; 2001, 83 – 124) and Gouk (1999 ,
193 – 223) have done for Robert Hooke. I will only add a few thoughts on Francis Bacon to Gouk ’ s ( 1999 ,
157 – 170) pioneering treatment. I barely mention Robert Fludd and Athanasius Kircher, both deeply involved in
music and natural philosophy, but whose relation to the new philosophy was antagonistic or tangential.
In Kircher ’ s case, much remains to be done to explore the whole range of his thought and clarify music ’ s place
in it. For some helpful beginnings, see Findlen 2004 ; Engelhardt and Heinemann 2007 ; Pangrazi 2009 ; Kircher
2011 ; McKay 2012.
For treatments of the relation of music and sound to the biological and medical sciences, see Kassler 1995;
Horden 2000; Volmar 2012, 2013b.
See, e.g., Galison 1997 ; Daston and Lunbeck 2011. Ford (2004, 314 – 315) notes that Aristotle mostly used
the term mousik ē to denote what we call music, rather than poetry.
Thompson 2002 ; Sterne 2003 ; Jackson 2006 ; Hui 2013a,b. Hui, Kursell, and Jackson 2013 includes a rich
variety of approaches.
Schwartz 2011 ; Smith 1999 treats an early modern soundscape in rich detail. Jay 1994 investigates the
modern denigration of vision as the primary modality of knowledge.
See Van Wymeersch 1999; Gozza 2000; Moreno 2004; Kittler 1999, 2006 ; Erlmann 2010, 2004 ; Ziemer
