112 SITUATING HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
out other-regarding constraint on actions and, on the other hand, forms of
socialism which deem any taint of self-interest in one’s motives a sign of
moral vice. If the model I have developed is correct, then we do not need to
choose.
The toad god work: Sen’s capabilities approach and
the idea of meaningful work
In the previous sections I focused on two structural features of work in a
market economy that generatespecifically moralhazards for those involved
in these institutional settings. I turn now to what we might think of as an
intellectual hazard—although it has important normative consequences—and
that is the treating of human well-being purely in economic terms.
Contemporary theories of well-being are dominated by utilitarianism—
and this is especially true in the philosophical discourses surrounding eco-
nomics and HRM. Within this literature, ‘well-being’ is typically under-
stood as involving the maximization of utility where utility is understood in
purely economic terms. Such an approach has recently—and powerfully—
been challenged by Amartya Sen and his so-called ‘capabilities approach’.
Sen introduces what we might think of as quasi-Aristotelian element into
utilitarian thinking. Instead of rejecting utilitarianism he attempts to refor-
mulate some of its central ethical orientations; most importantly, for our
purposes, he argues that the normative assessment of utilitarianism needs
to be grounded in what he labels ‘capabilities’. He argues that the focus
of social policy should be the development of human capabilities rather
than utility, at least as utility is typically understood (Sen 1992, 1995,
1999).
Sen distinguishes capabilities from functionings. Capabilities refer to an
agent’s potential functionings. Sen’s examples of functionings include taking
part in community activities, being well sheltered, living in a healthy manner,
being well-fed. One might think of the difference between a functioning and
a capability in terms of the difference between some concrete achievement
and the freedom to achieve that particular outcome. G.A. Cohen refers to
Sen’s approach as involving what he calls ‘midfare’; ‘[M]idfare is constituted of
states of the person produced by goods, states in virtue of which utility levels
take the values they do. It is posterior to “having goods” and “prior” to “having
utility”’ (Cohen 1993).
By focusing on capabilities, Sen moves away from the traditional utilitarian
focus on satisfaction and in so doing rules out of court the possibility of
a person habituating themselves to poor conditions. On Sen’s model one