168 ANALYSING HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
there is no clear and specific risk assumed, corresponding to that assumed by
the doctor, lawyer, or engineer for incompetent work. CEOs and other board
members get punished for failure in ways that HR practitioners generally do
not. Continuing education (mark 11) occurs but is not mandatory. On 12–15,
HRM does better. Fiduciary relations are recognized by HR practitioners and
so too are their social justice and advocacy roles. But on 16, whistle-blowing
is rare. As managers, their first loyalty is to the organization in a way that is
not professionally sequestered. Most probably a more uniformly coordinated
education and training and an enforced code of ethics and conduct could
greatly improve HRM’s independence of top management, the HRM voice
within it, and client service.
Conclusions
There are obstacles created by the presently dominant individualistic Anglo-
American corporate models, the form of employment contract, and the con-
sequent lack of autonomous status for HR practitioners. Of comparatively
negligible importance are lack of variable fee for service,pro bonowork, and a
shingle. For HR autonomy to be increased, both some measure of monopoly
and increased admission and training barriers, and obstacles to employers’
substituting of alternate untrained staff, must be shown to be needed. An ana-
logue of social remit and professional prerogative would have to be introduced
and justified.
HR practitioners do face ethical dilemmas arising from the clashing roles
which they are now asked to perform. They need some role clarification and
prerogatives such as confidentiality protection. They are enforcers of company
policy, instruments of downsizing, builders of positive culture, and change
managers. They are also neutral conflict resolvers, communicators, and medi-
ators between levels of the organization. And they are seen as advocates
of employees’ rights and counsellors. In the first bracket of roles they are
often the bearers of bad tidings from management regarding decisions over
which they have had little say. On the other hand, like professionals, they
are systems and job designers and keepers of confidences on some matters.
Many HR practitioners see themselves as ‘the meat in the sandwich’ (Ardagh
and Macklin 1999), subject to conflicts of interest when dealing with top
managers and unions, often possessing sensitive information of use to both
parties.
Enhancing their professional status would depend on clearly establishing
that they are managers and not union leaders, but developing stronger codes
and practices around the ‘corporate conscience’ role: pledge of altruism,