258 PROGRESSING HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
In the majority of cases, the problem is more likely to be framed in terms
of protecting knowledge from appropriation by rivals. Both scholars and
managers appear to be so preoccupied with the external competitive context
that they have ignored the more complex equation defining the competitive
and inherently contested organization–individual interface. In her analysis of
protective institutional mechanisms, Liebeskind (1997) details the effective-
ness and costs associated with rules, compensation schemes, and structural
isolation vis-à-vis appropriation by rivals. While correctly recognizing that
knowledge is embodied in employees and in the ‘knowledge products’ pro-
duced by employees, for example, plans, products, processes, and machinery,
Liebeskind (1997: 625) argues that:
Much of this knowledge can be transmitted from one firm to another by moving
either the knowledge products or the employees themselves. Thus, firms have both
the motive for, and the means of appropriating knowledge from rivals.
This perspective deals with inter-firm appropriation and does not recog-
nize the individual–organization appropriation interface, except to the extent
that individuals are perceived as disinterested agents in the transmission of
knowledge, not for their own use, but for the use of a rival organization.
Therefore, this perspective endorses the dominant strategic management view
underpinning the creation and utilization of knowledge: organizations retain
the rights to knowledge and the individual’s stake is immaterial. Tackling the
appropriation issue exclusively at the inter-firm level ignores the very critical
role individuals play or are likely to play in the knowledge creation, diffusion
and utilization process, as well as facilitating and/or preventing inter-firm
diffusion. This role can constitute an obstacle in the organization’s appropria-
tive efforts and it is erroneous to assume it can be addressed fully through
the governance structures and protective mechanisms that Liebeskind (1997)
considers appropriate for HR and products.
In large Japanese firms, it is presumed that people willingly share their
knowledge with colleagues and do so with a view to making a contribution to
the organization. It is suggested here that in non-Japanese organizations, this
idea of willing contribution needs to be treated with more caution. In more
individualistic contexts, and also where commitment to the organization is
not considered so much of a ‘fait accompli’ as it is in large Japanese firms, indi-
vidual choice cannot be wished away when it comes to sharing/participation.
Even where you have coercive management, or where highly directive leader-
ship styles and lack of empowerment appear to negate individual choice (in
any sort of organization, including Japanese), individuals often retain some
degree of discretion on the nature of their contribution to the organizational
purpose, that is to the corporate good. This is simply because the organization
cannot exercise absolute control over individuals’ choices and actions. This
leads to the question how willing are individuals to share their knowledge with