MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS 91crucial, to later discussions. Consider the difference between (NG) It is a logically
necessary truth that God exists and (CG) It is a logically contingent truth that God
exists. What (NG) says is (i) God does not exist is self-contradictory, (ii) there is no
possible world in which God does not exist, (iii) there is no way things might have
been such that God did not exist. What (CG) says is: (i) God does not exist is not
self-contradictory, (ii) there is a possible world in which God does not exist, (iii)
there is a way things might have been such that God did not exist.
It may appear that a monotheist should much favor (NG) over (CG), and indeed
some monotheists think this is so. But other monotheists do not think this; after all,
what (ii) and (iii) do is just say what (i) says, putting it in different terms. They
are not further differences between the two sorts of monotheist beyond their
difference regarding (i) versus (i).^6 A monotheist who accepts (CG) typically will
also accept (CG) It is logically impossible that God depend for existence on anything
else. Since she thinks that God exists is true, she will think both that God exists and
that God exists with perfect independence. The difference between types of
monotheism – between a monotheism to which (NG) is essential and a monotheism
to which (CG) is essential – is not unimportant. Here is why.
Suppose that Tim thinks that there are frogs and Tom thinks that there are not.
Tom is wrong, and Tim is right. Suppose that Tex agrees that there are frogs, but
also thinks that Necessarily, there are frogs is true. This is a remarkable belief on
Tex’s part. It entails that under any logically possible condition, there are frogs;
frog extermination is logically impossible. Not even God could get rid of frogs. Tim
thinks that there are frogs all right, but he denies that there would be frogs no
matter what, that it is logically impossible that frogs be exterminated; he supposes
that God could create a frogless world – all of which Tex denies.
Just as one or the other of Tim (who thinks there are frogs) and Tom (who thinks
there are not) is right, so one or the other of Tim (who thinks there might not have
been frogs) and Tex (who thinks it is logically impossible that there not have been
frogs) is right. Again, of course, Tim wins. But notice the difference between the
Tim/Tom and the Tex/Tim disagreements. We can represent them as follows:
Tim/Tom
Tim: There are frogs. [F]
Tom: There are no frogs. [not-F]
Tex/Tim
Tex: It is a logically necessary truth that there are frogs. [Necessarily, F]
Tim: It is not a logically necessary truth that there are frogs. [Not-
(Necessarily, F)]
Tim and Tom hold contradictory beliefs. So do Tex and Tim. What Tex believes to be
logically necessary, Tim believes not to be logically necessary. We can also put the
dispute between Tex and Tim this way: