8

Nonmonotheistic conceptions of

ultimate reality

J

ainism has basically one account of ultimate reality; there are (and
always have been) persons and there are (and always have been) the
physical elements of which observable physical things are composed. There
is no deity on which either depend for existence or arrangement. The Jain
tradition is doctrinally homogeneous, so there is no need to say that it is this
rather than that type of Jainism that is being described.
The Buddhist traditions range from the Theravada view, described here,
through the Absolutism that is part of Mahayana and the at least nearly
monotheistic perspective of Pure Land. For the moment, let us leave nirvana out
of the account. Theravada Buddhism holds that (besides nirvana) what there is
encompasses only momentary, dependent things. These things are^1 momentary
states, some mental and some physical (some involving consciousness, some
not). Much of later Buddhism accepts only mental states. These two claims^2 are
as nearly orthodoxly Buddhist as anything; those who denied them were
regarded as heretics. Everything is radically impermanent, transitory, fleeting;
nothing exists independent of other things.
Advaita Vedanta Hinduism is itself a variety of Absolutism, which we will
describe in contrast to the non-Absolutist views of two other varieties of
Vedantic Hinduism. Advaita Absolutism holds that all that exists is qualityless
Brahman. There is one thing, not many, and this one thing of course stands in
no relation to any other thing. Nor does this one thing have any qualities
whatever.
The task before us in this chapter, then, is to come to understand these three
quite different, but all nonmonotheistic, accounts of what there is. Since Advaita
Vedanta is perhaps best understood in contrast with the other varieties of
Vedanta, which are monotheistic, beginning with it provides the easiest
transition from the discussion of the previous chapter.