NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS 107Manindra’s images. Suppose Manindra’s images are caused by another mind or
spirit. Then all of perception is illusory in the sense that there are no objects that
cause our perceptual images. Now, one might suggest, this gives us what we might
call a minimally informative causal theory of perception. It may be that this
theory, while it has little to commend it philosophically, is the one to use in trying
to explain Shankara’s theory if we wish to use sensory analogies. Even this is
dubious. On this account, which goes further than Locke’s, Manindra sees a green
tree will be true if and only if there is no green tree that Manindra sees. In fact, all
analogy with perception has vanished. Further, in order to come to Shankara’s
view, one must somehow keep whittling away until neither Manindra’s mind nor
the mind that caused the images in Manindra’s mind is thought of as having any
properties. One wonders if one is then offering any account of anything. Further,
Brahman is not construed as the cause of anything, and so is not conceived as the
cause of perception. The most sensible procedure, then, would seem to be to leave
perceptual analogies alone. In effect, this is what does happen when the Advaitin
appeals to levels of being or to levels of truth or to the appearance/reality
distinction construed in an Advaitin way.
Reductionism and eliminativism
Brahman accepts the claim, relative to each individual person or atman, that it is
identical to Brahman. How is this to be understood? Consider a simple identity
statement:
Ia Cicero is identical to Tully.
What this means is simply:^11
Ia* “Cicero” designates the same person as “Tully” designates.
Shankara intends:
IIa The Atman is identical to Brahman.^12
to entail:
IIa* “Atman” designates what “Brahman” designates.
But this tells us only a little. Idealism regarding physical objects contends that a
physical object is identical to a collection of sensory images. This can be understood