114 CONCEPTIONS OF ULTIMATE REALITYminuscule proportions. An atom was as small as anything can get, and was
composed of no parts whatever. Homogeneous and ultimately tiny, atoms
(Newton taught) are the things of which larger physical items are composed.
Suppose that at time T1 there is just one atom; call it Alice1. Suppose that
at time T2 there is also just one atom; call it Alice2. Then ask: is Alice1
identical to Alice2? The answer is “Yes” provided Alice1 has stayed in
existence from T1 through T2. Otherwise, Alice2 is a new atom.
Now suppose that instead of being a material atom, Alice1 is a person, a
self-conscious immaterial mind, and the same for Alice2. Then ask: is Alice2
is identical to Alice1? The answer is “Yes” provided Alice1 has stayed in
existence from T1 through T2. Otherwise, Alice2 is a new person.
Suppose Alice1 exists only at T1 and Alice2 exists only at T2; then they
are not identical. This is the Buddhist answer to the identity of any
incomposite thing over time. If there is such a thing as an Alice, it is simply a
matter of there being a series composed of Alice1 at T1 and Alice2 at T2 (and
perhaps Alice3 at T3, and so on). An Alice over time is a series of momentary
Alices-at-one-time.
The difference, then, is that on a Jain account a person is one incomposite
thing that exists over time – that endures through a series of times –
whereas on a Buddhist account a person is a series of composite things no
one of which exists over time.
The importance of the accounts of persons
To one trained in contemporary academic contexts, it may seem unlikely if
not wildly implausible that issues in metaphysics, and disputes about such
issues, be taken to be of central religious importance – to be viewed as
matters centrally affecting salvation or enlightenment versus damnation or
ignorance. But of course we do not get to decide these things; the indigenous
authors and interpreters of normative texts, and the participants in the
relevant rites and institutions related thereto, decide them. Thus on both
Jain and Buddhist accounts of the matter, getting these metaphysical matters
right^34 is central to becoming, and constitutive of being, enlightened.
Further, from a Jain perspective, the Buddhist account ascribes too little
(essentially, nothing) to being a person for any enlightenment to be
possible, and from a Buddhist perspective the Jain account ascribes too much
to being a person for enlightenment to be possible. One might say: the
Buddhist thinks the Jain soul is too heavy to ride safely in the Great Vehicle
and the Jain thinks the Buddhist (non-)soul too frail to get in the boat.