126 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONStypical monotheism, so that route is closed. An omnicompetent but morally
imperfect being would not be God.
Suppose, then, that a being is morally perfect but limited in either
knowledge or power in such a way that, for certain evils at least, it
would prevent them if it could but it cannot prevent them. This being
also would not be God in any typical monotheistic sense. To see this,
consider a being limited in knowledge; suppose that God lacks the
knowledge to prevent evil, though God has the power to do so. Suppose
also that I, walking alongside my friend Jon, know that if he does not
stop walking now, he will be hit by a car. Then except under really
extraordinary circumstances I am wicked if I do not stop him if I know
how, and except under really extraordinary circumstances I will know a
variety of ways to stop him. But, by the present hypothesis, God lacks
that knowledge. So relative to preventing the evil of Jon’s being hit by
a car, I am smarter than God. But no being that I am smarter than,
relative to preventing evil, is worthy of the name “God.” Hence
limiting divine knowledge to “solve” the problem of evil is no more
successful than denying divine goodness.
Suppose instead that God’s power is limited relative to preventing at
least certain evils – God knows how to prevent them but lacks the
ability to put that knowledge to work. I know that if Sharon is getting a
migraine, the appropriate strength pain pill plus strong sweet tea will
prevent it, and typically I have the power to provide both pill and tea.
But, on the present hypothesis, God lacks the power so to act, because
so acting would prevent evil. But no being that, relative to preventing
an evil, has less power than I do is worthy of the name “God.” Hence
limiting divine power as a “solution” to the problem of evil is no more
successful than is limiting divine knowledge.
We could follow a strategy of allowing that God can prevent any
evils we can prevent but that God cannot prevent any evils we cannot
prevent. Or we could deny that God could do any evil-prevention that
required more knowledge than K or more power than P, where K
represents some degree of knowledge way above what Einstein had but
short of omniscience and P represents some degree of power way above
that possessed by the world’s strongest person but short of
omnipotence. A condition of there being a point to attempting some
such distinction is that we have some reason to think that God could be
justified in allowing the evils that can be prevented by someone who
has knowledge up to degree K or power up to degree P but not justified
in allowing evils whose prevention would require more knowledge or
power. So far as I know, no attempt has been made to do this, and there
is no reason to think it a promising enterprise.