ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONOTHEISM 127Summary regarding a finite deity and evil
The motivation to take refuge in the idea of a finite God – one limited in
power and/or knowledge – can be motivated by this general assumption: the
existence of an evil E is evidence against the existence of God unless it is the
case that either (i) God lacks the power to prevent E, or (ii) God lacks the
knowledge to prevent E. Considering all the evil there is, the consequent
limitation on divine power, or divine knowledge, is enormous. No being so
limited in power or knowledge is God.
It can also be motivated by a more nuanced assumption: the existence of
an evil E is evidence against the existence of God unless it is the case that
either (i) God lacks the power to prevent E, or (ii) God lacks the knowledge to
prevent E, or (iii) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing E. This
assumption involves three claims. The actual evils that can be prevented by a
being with power of degree P or degree of knowledge K are evils God has a
morally sufficient reason for allowing. The actual evils that God has no
morally sufficient reason for allowing are all evils whose prevention would
require a degree of power beyond P and/or a degree of knowledge beyond K.
God’s power and knowledge end at P and K. The claims involved in this
assumption are arbitrary. There is no reason to suppose that they correspond
to any actual differences in evils, knowledge, and power.^6
Denying that there is evil, or so restricting one’s notion of God so that
God is morally imperfect or so limited in power or knowledge that
preventing evil exceeds divine capacities, all are dead ends for monotheism.
These “answers” to the claim that evil is evidence against monotheisms are
thinly disguised admissions to the charge. Monotheism has been right in
firmly resisting these moves.
If the existence of evil is evidence against God’s existence, this does not
settle the issue as to whether God exists or as to whether it is reasonable to
believe that God exists. There might, for example, be equally strong or
stronger evidence in favor of God’s existence. But the notion that the
existence of evil actually is evidence against God’s existence should not itself
be accepted without careful examination. As we have noted, evil is evidence
against there being a God only if (a) (E) There is evil and (G) God exists are
logically incompatible, or (b) if (E) plus some set S of discernible truths is
logically incompatible with (G). But is either (a) or (b) true?