ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONOTHEISM 135doing, and (ii) nothing we know ahout S is incompatible with S’s
actually being in C when S endured E.^16
D2 An evil E is imaginably but not contextually pointful relative to
person S if and only if (i) we can a describe condition C such that if S
is in C and endures E, it is possible that her doing so will be a
necessary condition of S coming to have property Q, where S’s having
Q is a sufficiently good state of affairs that one who allowed S to
endure E for the sake of S coming to have Q would be morally
justified in so doing, and (ii) something we know about S is
incompatible with S’s actually being in C when S endured E.
By contrast:
D3 An evil E is unimaginably pointful relative to person S if and only if
we cannot describe a condition C such that if S is in C and endures E,
it is possible that her doing so will be a necessary condition of S
coming to have property Q, where S’s having Q is a sufficiently good
state of affairs that one who allowed S to endure E for the sake of S
coming to have Q would be morally justified in so doing.
Imaginably and contextually pointful evils are the least plausible
candidates for use in an attempt to derive not-(G) God does not exist from
(E) There is evil. Thus we will consider arguments that deal with the
notions of the other sorts of evils. One might begin, then, with these
reflections and offer either of the following arguments.
The “imaginably but not contextually pointful” argument
1 There are imaginably but not contextually pointful evils.
2 If there are imaginably but not contextually pointful evils then there
are actually pointless evils.^17
3 There are actually pointless evils (from 2, 3).
4 If there are actually pointless evils, then God does not exist.
5 God does not exist (from 3, 4*).
The key premises in this argument are (2) and (4); we will first consider
(2*). It is a restricted version of The We Would Know Claim. Even if, as we
argued above, the unrestricted version is false, this restricted version might
be true. Since it approves the inference from There are imaginably but not
contextually pointful evils to There are pointless evils, what it says is
tantamount to Evils that are not contextually pointful are actually
pointless. Is that true?
The other, similar argument is the “unimaginably pointful” argument.