PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A contemporary introduction

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136 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS

The “unimaginably pointful” argument


1 There are unimaginably pointful evils.
2
If there are unimaginably pointful evils then there are actually
pointless evils.^18
3 There are actually pointless evils. (from 1, 2)
4
If there are actually pointless evils, then God does not exist.
5 God does not exist (from 3, 4*).


The key premises of this argument are (2) and (4); we will first
consider (2*). It is a differently restricted version of The We Would Know
Claim. Even if, as we argued above, the unrestricted version is false, this
restricted version might be true. Since it approves the inference from There
are unimaginably pointful evils to There are pointless evils, what it says is
tantamount to Evils that are unimaginably pointful are actually pointless.
Is that true?
Concerning premise 2
of the “imaginably but not contextually
pointful” argument: evils that are not contextually pointful are actually
pointless
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that premise 1 is true. This helps
the critic only if premise 2
is also true. Granting premise 1 grants this:
there are evils that may have some point, but no point we can think of that
they might have is compatible with what seems true about the
circumstances in which they occur. What premise 2
says is that if there are
evils that may have some point, but no point we can think of that they
might have is compatible with what seems true about the circumstances in
which they occur, then there is no point that they do serve.
Suppose a man wears a paper bag on his head. While either the man has a
mustache, or he does not, so long as the bag is over his head it is neither
apparent that he does nor apparent that he does not. We just can’t see.
Similarly, while either an evil has a point or it does not, it is possible that
we cannot tell which is the case.^19 Competitive to premise 2*, then, is:


2a* If there are imaginably but not contextually pointful evils then there
are evils regarding which we should suspend judgment as to whether
or not they actually have a point.^20


Where premise 2 counsels a specific conclusion (there are pointless evils),
its competitor 2a
commends suspense of judgment regarding that
conclusion. Not surprisingly, the same issue comes up again regarding the
unimaginably pointful argument.

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