ARGUMENTS AGAINST MONOTHEISM 149truth, then P is, if false, necessarily false). If it appears that X is a
possibility, and X is not a possibility if P is true, then the apparent
possibility of X is evidence against P’s truth. The argument here is that
the logical possibility of the saintliness scenario is evidence against The
Actually Pointless Evil Claim (that God would not allow pointless evil)
if it limits having a point to Definition 1. What is required, if The
Actually Pointless Evil Claim is to be true, is that it be construed along
lines as least as broad as:
Definition 3: Evil E has a point if and only if (a) there is some
good G such that (i) E’s obtaining is a logically
necessary condition of G’s obtaining, and (ii) G’s
obtaining is of sufficient worth to justify E’s being
permitted in order to make G possible or (b) there is
some good G such that (iii) God can bring good G out
of E’s occurrence, and (iv) G’s obtaining is of sufficient
worth to justify E’s being permitted, whether or not E
is a logically necessary condition of G.
Common Reasoning, however reliable relative to the scope of natural
objects, artifacts, the means and ends of human persons, it does not
follow that it is reliable concerning the means and ends used by a person
whose cognitive capacities, moral goodness, and causal powers vastly
exceed our own.
One thing that makes deciding between:
(R) (For Roweanism) If a case in which one wishes to apply reasoning
of the sort 1–3 exhibits – Common Reasoning – is one dealing with
natural objects, artifacts, the means and ends of human persons, or
the means and ends of a person whose cognitive capacities, moral
goodness, and causal powers vastly exceed ours, then the result of
applying it is reasonably believed to be reliable.
and
(R*) If a case in which one wishes to apply reasoning of the sort 1–3
exhibits – Common Reasoning – is one dealing with natural objects,
artifacts, or other human persons, then applying it is reasonably
believed to be reliable; if a case in which one wishes to apply
reasoning of the sort 1–3 exhibits – Common Reasoning – is one
dealing with a person whose cognitive capacities, moral goodness,
and causal powers vastly exceed ours, it is reasonable to think that
such reasoning is as likely to be unreliable as it is to be reliable.