ARGUMENTS FOR MONOTHEISM 1773P.
4 If P then G. So:
5G.
and that form is logically impeccable. If there are any problems with the
argument, then, it is that one or more of its premises are false.
Premise 1 is true. Having maximal greatness is a matter of having
maximal excellence in every possible world; having maximal excellence in
every possible world is tantamount to necessarily having maximal
excellence. It is not hard to see this provided we keep in mind what the
notion of maximal greatness involves, namely having being omnicompetent
in all possible worlds. For any quality Q, to say that something has Q in all
possible worlds is to say that it is logically necessary that it has Q. This claim
is, as premise 1 says, true unless it is a necessary falsehood. Any proposition
of the form Necessarily, P is necessarily true if true and necessarily false if
false. Necessarily, God has maximal greatness is either true or false; so it is
necessarily true or necessarily false. Thus, if it is not necessarily false (i.e.,
self-contradictory), then it is necessarily true; that is what premise 1 claims.
Premise 3 follows from premises 1 and 2; since God cannot have maximal
greatness without existing, premise 4 is true; premises 3 and 4 entail premise
- Everything depends, then, on whether premise 2 is true. Is it true?
In considering this question, it is helpful to consider some arguments that
are analogous to the current version of the Ontological Argument.
The X argument
1x Necessarily, God does not exist is true unless it is self-contradictory.
2x Necessarily, God does not exist is not self-contradictory. So:
3x Necessarily, God does not exist is true.
4x If Necessarily, God does not exist is true then God does not exist. So:
5x God does not exist.
This argument is also valid, and premise 1x is true for reasons exactly
analogous to those noted regarding premise 1. Premise 4X is obviously true.
So if premise 2x is true, then the argument is a proof. Is premise 2x true?
The Y argument
1y God exists is logically contingent is true unless it is self-contradictory.
2y God exists is logically contingent is not self-contradictory. So: