234 ARGUMENTS: MONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSexperience, one could dispute the claim that they would be of the same
kind. If Sort 1 experiences are not of the same kind as Mary’s at least
apparent experience of God, it may also be the case that the requirement
that they be of the same kind is too unclear to give any force to the idea
that relevant possibly confirming and possibly disconfirming experience be
of the same kind.) Were experiences of Sort 2 to occur, we would have
experiences more clearly of the same kind as Mary’s – experiences at least
apparently of a powerful, overwhelming non-human being who was, not
holy and loving, but wicked and hateful; these experiences would be
experiential evidence against God exists. It is logically possible, and in fact
possible, that such experiences occur. So it is not logically, or in fact,
impossible that there be experiential evidence against God’s existence, both
not of the same sort as Mary’s and of that sort. Mary is likely to have no
reason to think that such experiences are logically impossible, and she
would be mistaken to think that they were. So Conditions 3 and 6 raise no
barrier to Mary’s experience being evidence. Nor is Mary likely to have any
reason to think that her experience is caused by someone or something
other than God. So Condition 5 raises no difficulties. For many, probably
most, experiences like Mary’s, (P*) is indeed satisfied. Hence premise 2 is
true.
Evidence only for the experiential subjects?
Suppose one learns that explorers in northern Minnesota have discovered
thick-furred black squirrels, hitherto thought to inhabit only the East with
their center on the Princeton University campus, that thrive on pine cones
and fish as well as nuts and weigh as much as forty pounds. The explorers’
squirrel-spotting and squirrel-weighing experiences satisfy (P*), and so are
evidence for there being the squirrel giants. They also satisfy (P) and so
provide the explorers with evidence for their conclusions. There is nothing
to prevent one from learning from all this that northern Minnesota is
blessed with giant black squirrels without oneself making a trip there.
Similarly, if religious experiences occur that satisfy (P*), and so are
evidence, and satisfy (P*) relative to their subjects who accept the
experiences as evidence, they provide evidence for the claim that God
exists. There is no reason why one cannot learn of the occurrence of such
experiences, consider (P) and (P) relative to one’s own situation, and
conclude that these experience, had by others, provide one with evidence
that God exists. Indeed, there would be nothing unreasonable in taking
them to be such evidence, even if their subjects did not, provided one had
no reason to think that those subjects were anything other than mistaken