ARGUMENTS (1) 247at a later time is some relation R that holds between the bundles. There is a
constraint on what relation R can be. It cannot be numerical identity over
time, since R is supposed to explain – to state the sufficient conditions for –
numerical identity of persons over time.
The idea, then, is that a person at a time is a bundle B1 of momentary
apersonal elements, that a person at another time is another bundle B2 of
momentary elements. No element in one bundle can be identical to an
element in another bundle. Over time, a person is a series of bundles. Our
concern here is with the structure of this type of view, not with its content.
There are different accounts of what the alleged elements are that make up a
person at a time; they may be viewed as physical, as mental, or as some of
each. There are different notions of what relation R allegedly relates bundles
over time into one person: perfect or imperfect resemblance, temporal
continuity, memory, causality, a combination of these, and so on. If the
critique offered here is correct, then questions of content and relationship
become moot; no such view can succeed if the critique is correct. One thing
the Complexity View cannot allow is that a person is a substance – a simple
thing that endures over time. It is precisely that substantival view (whether
the substance be viewed as mental or as physical) that the Complexity View
is intended to supersede. We will consider arguments for the view that
persons are bundles in the next chapter in connection will appeals to
experience; these have been historically the most influential arguments for
the view. In this chapter, we will consider arguments against the view.
Jainism, Buddhism, and the justice requirement
One can put the Buddhist view this way. There are persons(1) and persons(2):
1 Tom is a person(1) if and only if Tom is a one-or-more-membered
bundle of conscious states at time T and Tom exists at no time other
than T.
2 Tom is a person(2) if and only if Tom is a more-than-one-membered
series of persons(1).
Let the notion of a constituent be defined as follows: A is a constituent of B if
and only if (i) B is composite or has parts, and (ii) A is a part of B. Given the
Buddhist account of person(2), a person(2) can have a constituent. Further,
since even momentary bundles can be complex, persons(1) can have
constituents.^12 On the Jain account of persons, persons can have no
constituents. At a time, on the Buddhist account, a person simply is a bundle of
conscious states. This is all there is to any person – say, Amy – at a given time.