ARGUMENTS (1) 2497 It is not logically possible that the existence a moment from now of
something just like me would prevent me from existing a moment
from now. (from 5 and 6)
8 If a Buddhist-type view of persons is true, then the existence a
moment from now of something just like me would prevent me from
existing a moment from now.^14
9 If the existence a moment from now of something just like me would
prevent me from existing a moment from now, then it is logically
possible that the existence a moment from now of something just like
me would prevent me from existing a moment from now. (See
comment after 2.)
10 If a Buddhist-type view of persons is true, then it is logically possible
that the existence a moment from now of something just like me
would prevent me from existing a moment from now. (from 8 and 9)
11 A Buddhist-type view of persons is not true. (from 7 and 10)
The truth of the first premise, I take it, is not in question.^15 The second
premise invokes the unexceptionable principle If X is actual, then X is
possible. The fourth premise notes that if my existing at all is logically
possible, and my existing at time T1 is logically possible, there is nothing
logically impossible about my existing at T2. Given the truth of premise 4,
for any time T you like, it is logically possible that I exist at T and that
there is something else just like me^16 that also exists at T that is neither
identical to me at T nor identical to what was me at T*-minusone; this is
what premise 6 says. The remainder of the premises either simply state
what is true about a Buddhist-type view or are entailed by premises already
noted. This seems a powerful, indeed successful, external critique.
An internal critique of the view that persons are bundles
Internal critiques of the sort relevant here come in two brands: an
argument to the effect that the Buddhist-type account is internally
inconsistent, or an argument to the effect that a Buddhist-type account is
inconsistent with other Buddhist claims. Jain and Buddhist doctrines now
diverge on two further points. In order to express them precisely, let us
adopt a bit of technical terminology, but in order to express them clearly,
let it be only a tiny bit. The Jain view of persons, we have noted, entails
that for any person Lucy, all of Lucy exists at each moment at which Lucy
exists. Lucy contains no elements; she is incomposite; she enjoys numerical
identity over time. She is, then, a noncomposite endurer. On the Buddhist
view, there are no noncomposite endurers. Instead, there are noncomposite