250 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSnonendurers. These are single momentary constituents. There are composite
nonendurers. These are bundles of noncomposite nonendurers. There are
composite endurers. These are successions of composite nonendurers.
Certain claims regarding recompense^17 and memory naturally arise from a
Jain account of persons. The claims are these:
(J1) If Lucy at T1 receives recompense for something A done by a person at
time T, then Lucy at T1 is a noncomposite endurer who is
numerically identical to the person (the noncomposite endurer) who
did A at T.
(J2) If Lucy at time T1 remembers performing action A at time T, then Lucy
is a noncomposite endurer who is numerically identical at T and T1.
It is necessarily true that no Buddhist person/recompense pair ever satisfy
(J1) and that no Buddhist person/memory pair ever satisfy (J2).^18
The Buddhist replacements for (J1) and (J2) will be something along the
lines of:
(B1) If Lucy at T1 receives recompense for something A done by a
person at time T, then Lucy at T1 is a composite nonendurer who
is a member of (an element of or a constituent in) a composite
endurer in which the composite nonendurer that did A at T is an
earlier member.^19
(B2*) If Lucy at time T1 remembers performing action A at time T, then
Lucy at T1 is a composite nonendurer who is a member of (an
element of or a constituent in) a composite endurer in which the
composite nonendurer that did A at T is an earlier member.
If you like, (the right sort of) composite nonendurer is a Buddhist
person(1) and (the right sort) of composite endurer is a Buddhist
person(2). Recompense and memory require that the recompense and
the rememberer be persons(1) within the same person(2).
The doctrines cited in (J1) and (J2) require that there be
noncomposite endurers; that among the denizens of the actual world
such things are to be found. Consider these replacements for (J1) and
(J2):
(B1a) If Lucy at T1 receives recompense for something A done by a
person at time T, then Lucy at T1 is a composite nonendurer who
is identical to a composite nonendurer which did A at T.^20
(B2a) If Lucy at time T1 remembers performing action A at time T,
then Lucy at T1 is a composite nonendurer who is identical to
the composite endurer that did A at T.