PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A contemporary introduction

ARGUMENTS (1) 255

Since each bears relation R to Edward, any Complexity Account of Persons
must answer affirmatively. Tedward is identical to Edward. Nedward is
identical to Edward. But Tedward and Nedward are not identical to one
another. Identity is reflexive and transitive. So they cannot both be
identical to Edward, and any view that says they are is false because it says
that.

Scenario four

Our final scenario has Edward entering a Digitator 201X, popularly called a
Double Copier (see Figure 4). When Edward enters it at time T1, the
machine at time T2 produces two copies of Edward – Tedward and Nedward

• without annihilating Edward. But now Edward at T2, and Tedward, and
  Nedward all bear R to Edward at T1. So on any Complexity Account of
  Persons, all are identical to Edward at T1; each is the same person at T2 that
  Edward was at T1. But identity is reflexive and transitive. So Edward at T2,
  Tedward, and Nedward cannot be identical to one another. But then not
  more than one of them can be identical to – be the same person as – Edward
  at T1. So bearing R to one another cannot be sufficient for being the same
  person over time.

Reflections on the scenarios: the different results problem

It is striking that, then, on a Complexity View, one gets quite different results
in scenario two from what one gets in scenario one, and again in scenario four
from what one gets in scenario three. Given the Complexity View, in scenario
one one would expect that Tedward would be Edward; in scenario two, one

Figure 4 Digitator 201X