ARGUMENTS (1) 257would exist at a given time a person perfectly resembling me prevents me from
existing at that time. But while there are lots of things on which my
continuing to exist a moment from now depends, one of those things is not
whether a moment from now there could or will be someone perfectly
resembling me. I can exist a moment from now, and whether I do so or not is
not dependent on whether a twin pops up. But on a Complexity View, I exist a
moment from now only if no twin does pop up. That contention is false.
Whatever entails a false contention is itself false. Hence the Complexity View
is false. (Both twins would have to bear R to me.)
The argument here is this: the Complexity View entails that, for any person
S at time T, S will exist at time T-plus-1 only if, at time T-plus-1, there are not
two persons who (spatio-temporal properties aside) are perfectly resembling.
My existing a moment from now is compatible with God creating my perfectly
resembling twin a moment from now while not annihilating me. If my existing
a moment from now is compatible with God creating my perfectly resembling
twin a moment from now while not annihilating me, then it is false I will exist
a moment from now only if there does not then also exist another person who
perfectly resembles me. Hence, it is false that I will exist a moment from now
only if there does not then also exist another person who perfectly resembles
me. If it is false that I will exist a moment from now only if there does not then
also exist another person who perfectly resembles me then the Complexity
View is false. So the Complexity View is false. Indeed, since it entails things
that are not even possibly true, it is not even possibly true; it is necessarily
false.
The relevance of all this to Jainism and Buddhism
The relevance of these arguments to the dispute between Jainism and
Buddhism is this: Theravada Buddhism holds a Complexity View of persons.
The Jain tradition holds a Substantival View. The Complexity View is false.
Hence the Theravada view is false. If there is only the Substantival View and
the Complexity View, then the Substantival View is true.^27 It does not follow
that it is true in the Jain version thereof.^28 But at the very least, the Jain view of
what a person is will be closer to right than the Theravada Buddhist view.
On there being a fact of the matter
There is a reply to the criticisms that goes as follows: suppose that there is a
person – Sam, let’s say – at time T. Then at time T1 there come to be two
persons – Sam1 and Sam2 – each of whom bears R (whatever relation the