ARGUMENTS (1) 259A-in-W1 W1 is distinct from C-in-W1 and A-in-W2 is identical to C-in-
W2; since C-in-W1 is identical to C-in-W2, it follows that A-in-W2 is
identical to C-in-W1. Since A-in-W1 is identical to A-in-W2, it follows
that “both” A-in-W1 and A-in-W2 are, and also are not, identical to “both”
C-in-W1 and C-in-W2.
Now the second reply can be put simply. The Complexity View entails
that Personal Identity View over time is logically contingent, and that view
is self-contradictory. Thus on a Complexity View, there is no such thing as
personal identity – were personal identity what a Complexity View says it
is, there would be no such things. There would be a fact of the matter about
Sam-at-T and Sam-at-T1 being the same person; he would not be, because
there would be no such thing as being the same person over time.
Put differently, on the Complexity View, with or without Sam1-and-
Sam2-type scenarios, there aren’t any persons – talk of persons is
“conventional” is a sense in which talking about persons is a way of speaking
to which nothing that is a person corresponds. This, of course, is not an
account of what persons are. It is a denial that there are any persons.
Substance theory
Jain dualism
There is a variety of arguments for mind–body dualism of the sort Jainism
embraces. Some of them are clear failures. Epistemological arguments for
mind–body dualism infer from something about the way in which we know
minds and bodies to the conclusion that the mind is distinct from the body.
Let X = my mind’s existing or that my mind exists, as grammatical structure
dictates; let Y = my body’s existing or that my body exists, as grammatical
structure dictates.
Argument 1: I can think of X without thinking of Y; If I can think of X
without thinking of Y, then not(X = Y), so: not(X = Y).
Argument 2: I cannot be mistaken with respect to X but I can be
mistaken with respect to Y; If I cannot be mistaken with
respect to X but I can be mistaken with respect to Y, then
not(X = Y), so: not(X = Y).
Argument 3: I cannot doubt X but I can doubt Y; If I cannot doubt X but
I can doubt Y then not(X = Y), so: not(X = Y).
Argument 4: I can be directly aware of X but I cannot be directly
aware of Y; If I can be directly aware of X but I cannot be
directly aware of Y then not(X = Y), so: not(X = Y).