ARGUMENTS (1) 2612 If it is logically possible that Manindra is self-conscious and
Manindra has no bodily states then Manindra’s being self-conscious is
not identical to Manindra’s having bodily states. So:
3 Manindra’s being self-conscious is not identical to Manindra’s having
bodily states.
This argument assumes some such claim as:
(N) If Manindra’s being self-conscious is identical to Manindra’s having
bodily states, then necessarily, Manindra’s being self-conscious is
identical to Manindra’s having bodily states.
The argument is plainly valid, and if (N) is true then premise 2 is true.
(N) expresses the doctrine of the necessity of metaphysical identity, for
which an argument was presented earlier. If – as appears the case – that
argument is a proof that extends our knowledge, and premise 1 is plainly
true, then the conclusion is true.
One way of continuing is to note regarding being self-conscious that
anything that has it would be radically different if it irretrievably lost it;
its causal powers would be greatly diminished and its causal potencies
would be significantly altered. Being self-conscious is a very plausible
property for being a kind-defining property or being an essential
property of anything that has it.^31 This reflection leads naturally to this
continuation of the argument:
4 It is logically possible for Manindra to exist as a self-conscious being
and for Manindra to have no body.
5 If it is logically possible for Manindra to exist as a self-conscious
being and for Manindra to have no body then Manindra existing as a
self-conscious being is not identical to Manindra’s having a body. So:
6 Manindra’s existing as a self-conscious being is not identical to
Manindra’s having a body.
This brief argument is powerful and controversial.
In spite of the fact that mind–body dualism seems not subject to the
sorts of critique to which complexity accounts of persons are subject, it is
widely rejected and often despised in contemporary academic studies. What
is favored instead is materialism, the view that there are material
substances but not substances of any other kind.^32 The materialism/dualism
controversy is complex and fascinating. There do not seem to be such
powerful arguments for materialism that dualism should be ruled out as a
viable position.