ARGUMENTS (2) 275could have only by virtue of other features also had by that thing. In the case
of a Roman coin, bearing the image of an emperor is one such feature. In the
enlightenment cases, presumably the relevant further features are such
qualities as having no sense of possessing qualities, feeling indestructible, and
being aware only of states of mind. It is, however, logically possible that one
possesses qualities that one has no sense of having, feels indestructible while
being dependent for existence on something else, and is aware of nothing but
one’s current mental states without being identical to those states even at the
time at which one has them. Further, that one has no sense of having qualities
is possible only if one does have qualities – to have no qualities at all is simply
not to exist at all, and not existing gets very much in the way of having
experiences. Having a sense of being indestructible is perfectly compatible
with not being indestructible, and having a sense of being momentary is
perfectly compatible with being an enduring thing.
One way of putting the problems with the notion that enlightenment
experiences are self-authenticating with regard to Advaita, Jain, or Buddhist
doctrinal claims is this:
(i) the claims are, if true of one at all, true of one so long as one exists,
whereas in the least controversial cases of self-authentication the claims
that are authenticated have to do with one’s existence right now or one’s
current, momentary states of awareness; the claims in cases where claims
to self-authentication is plausible are about a time span that corresponds,
and is limited, to the time during which the authenticating experience
occurs;
(ii) the quality or state ascribed to oneself by the claim is an observable
quality – like being in pain – or is entailed by any quality anything has –
like existing.
By contrast, the Advaita, Jain, and Buddhist claims concern times not limited to
the duration of the enlightenment experience and qualities neither observable
nor entailed by simply possessing any quality at all. Further, such states as
seeming to oneself to be qualityless, seeming to be indestructible, seeming to
be momentary are states that can easily be mistaken – one may seem to
oneself to be qualityless, indestructible, or momentary without these things
being in fact true.
It is important to remember here that we are not asking what sort of
phenomenological features an experience might have were one’s having it to
lead them to accept a particular religious doctrine, especially if one had it in a
context in which it was expected that such experiences might occur – for
example, within a meditative tradition the very purpose of which was the
preparation for having such experiences whose interpretation was built into
the institutional context within which the meditative practice occurred. We are