282 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONSThe argument stated specifically regarding our three
enlightenment traditions^12
Consider our three cases.
Advaita
Appearing to be qualityless not only is not evidence that one is qualityless
but is sufficient evidence for possession of qualities; it is logically impossible
that one have any experience at all and not exist, and logically impossible
that one exist without having qualities. Indian critics of Advaita Vedanta, the
most famous of whom is Ramanuja, have pressed this decisive objection with
great force and clarity.
Jainism and Buddhism
Appearing to oneself to be indestructible is not evidence that one is
indestructible. Claims of indestructibility, of course, are not made regarding
the body; Jain philosophers know as well as anyone that the human body is
not indestructible. What they claim, along with Plato and Platonists, is that
the mind or soul or person is indestructible in principle. The point remains,
however, that the mind or soul or person having an experience in which it
seems to itself to be indestructible in principle is not evidence that it is
indestructible in principle. Not only is it logically possible that one have an
experience in which it seems to them that they are indestructible though in
fact they are not; it is also that having such an experience is not any evidence
that one is indestructible, any more than having an experience in which one
seems to oneself to be destructible is evidence that one is destructible.
Similarly, a sense of one’s existence as momentary, or as composed of
momentary items is one thing, and one’s being in momentary existence or
being composed of things that exist only for an instant is another, and having
a sense of one’s momentariness is not evidence that one is merely
momentary or that one is composed of momentary constituents.
The argument restated
The argument can be stated along the following lines. Consider three
claims, each of which is true: