ARGUMENTS (2) 2831 There are states, like being in pain, feeling happy, worrying about
one’s health, and the like, where one’s having the sense that one is in
pain, happy, or worried, justifies one’s belief that one is in pain,
happy, or worried – such states involve phenomenological awareness
of the actual state that one ascribes to oneself and one’s being aware
of being in such a state is evidence that one is in it.^13
2 There are other states, like thinking that one can wave one’s arms
and fly, that one has grown a lion’s head, or that one’s head is made
of glass, where one’s having the sense that one can fly, has grown a
lion’s head, or one’s head is made of glass does not involve a
phenomenological awareness of one’s actually flying, actually having
a lion’s head, or actually having a head made of glass, and one’s
having such a sense is not evidence that one is in the state that one
ascribes to oneself.
When one believes on the basis of introspection that one is in one of the
sorts of states that 1 describes, one typically is right. When one believes on
the basis of introspection that one is in one of the sorts of states that 2
describes, one typically is wrong. Consider:
3 There are still other states, like thinking that one is the brightest
member of one’s class, the most talented actor in one’s school, an
immortal soul, someone who will die today, and the like, where one’s
having the sense that one is brightest, most talented, immortal, or
will die today does not involve a phenomenological awareness of
one’s actually being brightest, most talented, immortal, or dying
today, and one’s having such a sense is not evidence that one is in the
state that one ascribes to oneself.
In these cases, in contrast to those described in 2 it is not just obvious that
one is not in the state mentioned. But the cases are similar in this respect:
the state in question, unlike those mentioned in 1, is not a state that is
introspectively accessible or discernible. One cannot, so to speak, read off
one’s introspective awareness that one is in the sort of states described in 2
and 3. Nor is there any entailment between seeming to be in the state and
being in the state or any relation such that seeming to be in the state
renders it more likely than not that one is in the state.
Consider, then, this way of putting the argument:
A Enlightenment experiences are senses of being in a certain state and
they fall into either class 2 or class 3.
B Senses of being in a certain state that fall into either class 2 or class 3
are not evidence that the person who has that sense is in that state.