ARGUMENTS (2) 287it in that context, quoting both European and Indian representatives of
both positions. One position is propounded by Descartes, various Jain texts,
and Ramanuja, and the other asserted by David Hume and various
Theravada Buddhist texts.
The dispute here concerns, then, whether or not persons are self-
conscious and enduring substances. This matter, at least, Descartes,
Ramanuja, Jainism, Buddhism, and Hume think can be settled by appeal to
introspection. They disagree as to what the introspective evidence
confirms. We begin with the position that claims that introspection and
enlightenment experience clearly and incontrovertibly shows that persons
are enduring mental substances, and follow with the position that
introspection and/or enlightenment experience clearly and
incontrovertibly shows that persons at a time are but bundles of
momentary states, so that over time a person can be nothing more
substantial than a series of such bundles.
The duration problem
It is impossible for one to tell by immediate awareness at time T that one is,
or is not, something that does, or does not, endure beyond T. Descartes
emphasizes this: he knows by immediate awareness that he exists now –
that “I am, I exist, is... true each time that I pronounce it, or that I
mentally conceive it.” Appeal to memory is required. There are obvious
problems in appealing to memory to establish one’s own lack of endurance,
but for present purposes we shall simply set aside reference to duration and
lack of duration and consider only the idea that either the Jain sort of
appeal to experience can establish that persons are mental substances or the
Buddhist sort of appeal to experience can confirm that persons are
individual states.^15
Descartes
Descartes writes:
of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of some-
thing (or merely because I thought of something). But there is
some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who
ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt
I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as
he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as