310 RELIGION, MORALITY, FAITH, AND REASONRelations between the positions
It may be helpful in understanding these alternatives to see some of their
relationship laid out.
1 One can consistently be a determinist and an incompatibilist.
2 One can consistently be a determinist and a compatibilist.
3 One cannot consistently be a determinist and a libertarian.
4 One cannot consistently be an incompatibilist and a compatibilist.
5 Being a libertarian entails being an incompatibilist.
6 Being an incompatibilist does not entail being a libertarian.
7 Being a compatibilist does not entail being a determinist.Monotheistic determinism and monotheistic libertarianism
A fundamental dispute within monotheism concerns whether possession of
compatibilist freedom yields a world sufficiently different from
(monotheistic?) logical fatalism to allow for there to be human agents who
are morally responsible for their thoughts and actions. Libertarian
monotheists think that if the only sort of freedom human persons have is
so-called compatibilist freedom then God is cause of whatever evils our
thoughts and actions involve. Or they think that God is the only agent, and
that human personhood is mere appearance. Compatibilist monotheists
disagree. If compatibilism is false, then of course monotheists ought to
reject it. There is an interesting and powerful argument against
compatibilism.
An argument against compatibilism
Consider the TUD that is tensed to the time just before the last dinosaur
died; let that be TUDdino. Then suppose that you will decide to have a cup
of coffee at 3:00 this afternoon; let the TUD tensed to that time be TUDcup;
TUDcup, of course, includes a statement to the effect that you decide to
have a cup of coffee at 3:00. If determinism is true, then:
1 TUDdino and LL and LN entails TUDcup.
2 One is not responsible for anything that one has no control over.
3 One has no control over anything that is entailed by what one has no
control over.