314 RELIGION, MORALITY, FAITH, AND REASONIf (R) is true, then Ruth’s golden retriever will be fed, whether Ruth feeds
him or not. What can be up to Ruth is simply whether or not she feeds him.
She can make (GR) true, even though (GR) will be true whether she makes
it true or not. What Ruth can have control over, even if (R) is true, is
whether
(RG) It is Ruth who feeds Ruth’s golden retriever
is true. There is a distinction to be made between cases in which a
proposition will be true whether one so acts as to make it true or not and
cases in which a proposition will be true only if one so acts as to make it
true. What is in one’s control in the former cases is what happens by virtue
of which a particular proposition is true – whether it is true by virtue of
one’s own activities or by virtue of something else; what is in one’s control
in the latter cases is whether anything at all occurs in virtue of which a
particular proposition is true. Let us call instances of the former sort cases
of partial control and instances of the latter sort cases of full control.
Suppose that (R) will be true, whatever Ruth does. Since (R) Every
golden retriever in the world is well fed entails (GR) Ruth’s golden
retriever is well fed, the Control Principle tells us that whether (GR) is true
also does not depend on what Ruth does. (RG) It is Ruth who feeds Ruth’s
golden retriever, however, is not entailed by (R). Given (R) and the Control
Principle, the truth of (GR) is not under even Ruth’s partial control. Given
(R) and (GR), the truth of (RG) can still be under her partial control.
If determinism is true, some truths descriptive of a pre-Ruth past, plus
the laws of nature and the laws of logic – what we might call some preRuth
package of truths – either entails (RG) or entails not-(RG). This fact, plus
the Control Principle, entails that whether (RG) is true or not is also not
even in Ruth’s partial control.
Suppose determinism is true, and Ruth herself feeds her golden retriever
at time T. Then her doing so is in fact inevitable, and her not doing so is in
fact impossible. Suppose that determinism is true, and Ruth does not
herself feed her golden retriever at time T. Then her not doing so is in fact
inevitable and her doing so is in fact impossible. What is in fact impossible
for Ruth is not under Ruth’s control. So the Control Principle seems correct
in its implications regarding Ruth and the feeding of her golden retriever.
It is worth noting what, if determinism is true, the distinction between
partial control and full control amounts to. Consider what, if determinism
is true, having partial control means. We may as well consider this
concretely in terms once again of Ruth and her dog. If determinism is
true, then to say that Ruth has partial control regarding whether her dog
is fed is to say that the conditional If Ruth does not feed her dog, her dog
will be fed is true (the golden retriever Fairy will become active) but