RELIGION AND MORALITY 315either Ruth does feed her dog is in fact inevitably true or Ruth does not
feed her dog is in fact inevitably true. If determinism is true, then to say
that Ruth has full control regarding whether her dog is fed is to say that
the conditional If Ruth does not feed her dog, her dog will be fed is false
but either Ruth does feed her dog is in fact inevitably true or Ruth does
not feed her dog is in fact inevitably true. If whether her dog is fed or not
is in fact inevitable, and whether she feeds it or not is in fact inevitable, it
is hard to see how she is free with respect to her dog being fed. Why think
that, if determinism is true, anyone is ever free regarding anything?
Compatibilist replies
The natural compatibilist replies to this question amount to this: they
find some feature of Ruth that causes Ruth’s behavior, and claim that
there being a cause of this sort is what it amounts to for Ruth to be free.
Suppose Ruth feeds her dog, and her doing so she wants to do, intends to
do, and the like. Her body makes all the appropriate dog-feeding
movements because of her wants, desires, intentions, and like, and the dog
happily eats his dinner. But then Ruth – the compatibilist claims – feeds
her dog, and is responsible for doing so. If the sorts of thing she has done
are morally right or wrong, she is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy
for having done it. So she is free in whatever sense moral responsibility
requires.
The incompatibilist, whether she is a libertarian or not, wonders how
this can be so, in the light of the considerations previously noted – given
that if determinism is true, whatever is done is in fact inevitably done. To
answer, compatibilists have to give some account of freedom.
Possibility
It is helpful, in approaching compatibilist accounts of freedom, to highlight
three relevant concepts:
Logical inevitability: State of affairs A is logically inevitable if and
only if A obtains is a logically necessary truth.
In fact inevitability: State of affairs A is in fact inevitable if and only
if A obtains is entailed by the truth about the past, the
laws of nature, and the laws of logic.
These notions contrast to: