RELIGION AND MORALITY 317teeth gnashing and Karen gnashing her teeth, and if determinism being true is
compatible with making that distinction between actual cases, presumably the
difference will be one between a causal chain passing through Karen that
contains none of Karen’s action-inclining states (Karen’s teeth gnashing) and a
causal chain passing through Karen that does contain some action-inclining
state of her where the target of that state is her teeth being gnashed together
(Karen gnashing her teeth). An action chain relative to Karen’s performing
action A must pass through Karen in such a way that it contains action-
inclining states which are at least partial causes of A. This is one way, perhaps
the most natural, for a determinist to endeavor to distinguish between what is,
and what is not, an action: actions are the products of action chains that pass
through the person who acts in such a manner that the person’s action-
inclining states are at least among the action’s causes.
Suppose Sam decides to commit murder. If determinism is true, this decision
is in fact inevitable given things that occurred in the distant, preSam past. The
compatibilist will note that the causal chain that yields Sam’s decision “runs
through Sam,” so to speak, whereas other causal chains do not do so. The
earlier portion of the causal chain that yields the pre-Sam events whose
occurrence, if determinism is true, render his choice in fact inevitable has in
fact run through Sam. The compatibilist will add that there are logically
possible worlds in which Sam’s decision does not obtain; the events that render
Sam’s decision in fact inevitable would not obtain if one of those worlds was
the actual world. This is the difference between Sam’s decision being logically
inevitable and its being in fact inevitable. Presumably, if determinism is true, it
is not logically possible that the events that render his decision in fact
inevitable occur without his decision also occurring – not unless one could
have the same events but different causal laws. The core of the compatibilist’s
position will lie in the development of a notion of is under the control of where
something is under one’s control provided one could have done otherwise or
one was compatibilistically free relative to whether something occurred. Thus
compatibilist freedom invites our attention.
Compatibilist freedom
One suggestion regarding what this sort of freedom amounts to is this: let D be
a description of what has occurred up to time T, L a statement of the laws of
nature, and L* a statement of the laws of logic. Let their conjunct be the whole
past package. Jane wonders whether or not to lie to John. It turns out that Jane
lies to John is compatible with the whole past package, and Jane does not lie to
John is not compatible with the whole past package.^14 The idea is to leave room
for Jane’s being free even though what Jane will do must be compatible with