318 RELIGION, MORALITY, FAITH, AND REASONthe whole past package and only one of the logically possible alternatives is
compatible with that package; on this view, whatever sort of freedom
responsibility requires is constrained by this condition. Given the conditions
described, Jane will lie to John, her lying to John is in fact inevitable, and Jane is
morally responsible for lying to John is compatible with Jane’s not lying to John
is incompatible with the whole past package. Jane’s lying, on this account,
follows from what has happened prior to her lying, given the laws of logic and
the laws of nature.^15
The range of what can be said to give this alleged freedom content should
be explored. If Jane’s lying is an action on Jane’s part, it must be related to
Jane in certain ways – this, we might say, is the positive story regarding
Jane’s freely lying. The positive story is the story of the conditions regarding
Jane’s actually lying, whether it concerns what she did or what was not done
to her. Further, if she is free in performing that action, her not performing it
must have been available to her in certain ways – this, we might say, is the
negative story regarding Jane’s freely lying. The negative story is the story
of the conditions regarding the availability to Jane of refraining from lying.
The combination of the positive story and negative story, where both are told
with compatibilist constraints, will be the whole compatibilist story
regarding her freely lying. There is no universal agreement among
compatibilists as to how this story goes, and we will give a very full account
that captures a good many of the elements that compatibilists include in that
story. What we say about the version of the story here can also be said about
other compatibilist accounts.
Constraints
For an account of free action to be compatibilist, it must be the case that it
can be a true account even if determinism is true. Hence Jane’s action is in
fact inevitable (where in fact inevitable is understood as we have defined it)
and Jane’s action is free and she is morally responsible for so acting are
logically compatible. Our formulation of the compatibilist account will
endeavor to give as broad a definition as this constraint allows – to include as
many elements as it allows.^16
The positive story
Jane’s lying to John at time T obviously entails Jane lied to John at T. We
have already noted that, on a compatibilist account, it entails An action chain
that includes Jane’s lying to John at T passes through Jane.