RELIGION AND MORALITY 323The argument then goes as follows: in Case 1, John is responsible for
having chosen to stay and study, even though he could not have left had he
tried; in Case 2, Mary does not send the letter, even though she could not
have sent it had she tried. Neither John nor Mary, in the cases described,
possesses categorical freedom, but both are praiseworthy for their actions. If
they are praiseworthy, then they are responsible. So possessing categorical
freedom is not a logically necessary condition of being responsible for what
one does. Hence compatibilism is true.
Here is another way to put the argument. Since to make a choice is to act
(an action need not be overt), reference to actions covers choices as well.
Consider one version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities:
(PA) If person S is morally responsible for having performed action A
at time T in context C, then S could have refrained from
having performed action A at time T in context C.
According to (PA), if John is responsible for having stayed in his room, he
could have left it; if Mary is responsible for not having sent the letter, she
could have sent it. The point of the cases is that in them (PA) is false and John
and Mary are responsible anyway. The alleged truth of (PA) is what justifies
the claim that only possessors of categorical freedom are morally responsible
for what they do. Since (PA) is discernibly false, making that claim is not
justified. But that claim is essential to incompatibilism. So incompatibilism is
false. The core idea of this argument is this: if (PA) is false of a case in which
an agent acts, it is also false of that agent in that case that he possesses
categorical freedom, and there are cases in which an agent acts and is morally
responsible for so acting even though (PA) is false of that agent.
Reply to the objections
Regarding Case 1, there are various moves open to an incompatibilist. Here
are two:
Move 1: She can say that strictly what John is responsible for is not
staying in the room (he could not have done otherwise)
but choosing not to try to leave and deciding to study (he
could have chosen to try to leave, or not to study). This is
what he is responsible for, and (PA) is true of this.
Move 2: While Move 1 is correct so far as it goes, there is an
additional consideration. Suppose that a person is
categorically free regarding whether she does something