PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A contemporary introduction

(avery) #1
324 RELIGION, MORALITY, FAITH, AND REASON

A at time T and in circumstance C, and she knows that,
at T and in C, doing A is sufficient for the occurrence of
B. Given this knowledge, she does A in order that B
may occur. Then she is responsible for B occurring, even
if B would have occurred had she not done A. John’s
deciding to stay in is sufficient for John’s staying, and
John has categorical freedom regarding how he decides.
He is also properly held responsible for what he knows
his deciding to stay in is sufficient for.

Move 2 is neither problematic nor uncommon. Suppose a father knows
that if he does not promise to pay for his daughter’s tuition, her uncle
will, but since she is his daughter and he loves her, he wants the tuition to
be his gift to her, not anyone else’s. What is in the father’s power is
whether he pays the tuition, but not whether it is paid. He is responsible
for the tuition being paid, and his doing so is rightly taken, unless there is
special reason to the contrary, as an action he could either have performed
or refrained from performing. This fits the pattern described in Move 2.
Another way of seeing the point of Move 2 is to remember Ruth and
her golden retriever. The golden retriever will be fed whether Ruth feeds
her or not, just as John will stay in the room whether he tries to leave or
not. But Ruth is free to decide to do the feeding herself and John is free
not to try to leave and free to keep studying, as he is free to try to leave
and not to study.
Move 2 does require a clarification of (PA), which should now read:


(PA*) If person S is morally responsible for having performed action
A at time T in context C, then (i) S could have refrained
from having performed action A at time T in context C,
or (ii) there is some action B that S performed such that
S could have refrained from performing B, and S’s
performing B is, at T and in C, sufficient for S’s
performing A.


Exactly similar moves are relevant to Case 1. So far at least, the
incompatibilist is in no danger.


A compatibilist response


The compatibilist case is easily made subtler by tinkering with Case 2.
Consider:

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