338 RELIGION, MORALITY, FAITH, AND REASON1a It is now true that (i) either (ii) the next President of the US will be a
former Celtic center or (iii) the next President of the US will not be a
former Celtic center.
1b (i) is of the form ((ii) or (iii))
1c A proposition of the form ((ii) or (iii)) is true only if its components –
i.e., (ii) and (iii) – are either true or false. So (from 1a to 1c):
1d (ii) and (iii) are either true or false.
1e (iii) = not-(ii) (obvious).
1f If (ii) and (iii) are either true or false and (iii) = not-(ii), then either
(ii) is true or (iii) is true. So (from 1d to 1f):
1g Either (ii) is true or (iii) is true.
1h If (ii) is true, then some future tense statement is true.
1i If (iii) is true, then some future tense statement is true. So (from 1g to
1i):
1j Some future tense statement is true.
1k If some future tense statement is true, then future tense statements
can be true. So (from 1j and 1k):
1* Future tense statements can be true.
Further, if some future tense statements are now true, it seems arbitrary to
deny that the true ones are now true. But does this entail determinism?
That depends on what makes future tense statements true. Had Aristotle
stopped lecturing one day and laconically commented that in the future a
human being would stand on the surface of the moon, what he said would
have been true. What would have made it true was some human being
standing on the surface of the moon at some time later than that at which
Aristotle offered his comment. If instead Aristotle had said that some time
in the future someone would freely steal a pear, that would be made true by
someone freely stealing a pair at some time later than that at which
Aristotle’s comment was made. There seems no more problem in this case
than in the case of the human being standing on the surface of the moon.
Or, if there is any problem, it has to do with the relevant notion of
freedom, not with Aristotle getting something right before it happened.
That a proposition is true at some time T does not entail that what makes it
true obtains at T.^30 So present truth of future tense propositions does not
(contrary to 2) entail determinism.
Conclusion
After considerable searching, no genuine counterexample to the Principle
of Alternative Possibilities has surfaced. Suppose that Tricia is related to