FAITH AND REASON 357M3 There are experiences it is reasonable to think veridical that
are veridical only if monotheism is true (there is
experiential evidence for monotheism).
A falsificationist can accept the principle of experiential evidence used
in an earlier chapter, and the reports of persons to the effect that they
have had the experiences they report. She can thus accept M3 without
inconsistency. Put otherwise, a falsificationist can accept the argument
of Chapter 10 without accepting anything incompatible with her
falsificationism. So, of course, can a confirmationist. The argument
concludes:
M4 If monotheism has explanatory power regarding things hard to
explain otherwise, monotheism has not been falsified,
and there are experiences it is reasonable to think
veridical that are veridical only if monotheism is true,
then there is evidence that monotheism is true.
The conclusion is:
M5 There is evidence that monotheism is true.
If M4 is true, it is a necessary truth, and M1–M4 obviously entail
M5.
Weak rationality and strong rationality
How is one to understand M5? Here is one more set of definitions:
Definition 1: Rita is weakly reasonable in accepting proposition T
if and only if Rita accepts T, Rita is not unreasonable
in accepting T, and Rita would not be unreasonable in
rejecting T (where T is a theoretical proposition).
Being weakly reasonable in accepting T is equivalent to something in
the neighborhood of not believing against evidence and not believing
something that has no explanatory power. That proposition P is
believed with weak reasonability is compatible with not-P being
believed with weak reasonability, and with rational suspension of belief
regarding P.
Definition 2: Rita is strongly reasonable in accepting T if and only
if Rita accepts T, Rita is not unreasonable in accepting
T, and Rita would be unreasonable in rejecting T.