374 NOTES10 These matters are relevant to arguments to be considered later. It is the case that: (A) A
proof of a necessary truth can contain only necessary truths as premises, and (B) A proof
of a logically contingent proposition must contain at least one logically contingent
proposition among its premises. It is also, of course, true that: (C) No false proposition
can be proved, and (D) No argument that contains a false premise is a proof, even if its
conclusion is true.
11 “Behave” here is an anthropomorphism which unfortunately is seldom recognized as
such.
12 That this is approximate, and not a basic law, does not matter. Anyone who wants more
sophisticated examples is free to supply them.
13 Or a feature that follows from its essential features.
14 Strictly, essences typically are thought of as defining kinds of things; the view that there
are, in addition to essences or kinds of things, also essences of individuals is much more
controversial.
8 Nonmonotheistic conceptions of ultimate reality
1 Subject to a philosophical qualification noted in a later chapter.
2 Technically, impermanence and co-dependent arising.
3 Commentary on the Brahma-Sutra, II, 3, 7.
4 Pancandasi, III, 23–4.
5 Further, Shankara’s writings contain a sophisticated version of the view that there are
experience-independent physical objects.
6 Chandogya Upanishad 3.14.1.
7 The passage is from S. Subba Rao, Vedanta Sutras (Madras, 1904; 3.3.29, p. 141); cited in
J. Estlin Carpenter, Theism in Medieval India (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint
Corporation, 1977); first published by Williams and Norgate, London, 1921, with
quotations embedded in the text as indicated.
8 K. Satchidananda Murty, Reason and Revelation in Advaita Vedanta (Delhi: Motilal
Barnasidass, 1974), pp. 3–4. First published by Ahndra University Press and Columbia
University Press, 1959.
9 Strictly, no term more determinate than, say, substance.
10 Strictly, it is the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II (not the later Book
IV) account.
11 Allowing for a particular historical context.
12 Where “the Atman” refers to each “individual person” – the view, of course, entails the
remarkable consequence that there is at most only one individual person.
13 We can ignore here whether idealistic Oscar is one collection of present images or a
temporally sequenced series of collections.
14 At least for serious purposes in science and metaphysics.
15 I leave “collections of catty images” vague; in fact, there is no replacement for this phrase
that satisfies the idealist desiderata of (i) being phenomenologically adequate to our
sensory experience and (ii) not referring to what, if it exists, is a physical object.
16 Again, for purposes of metaphysics and high religion.
17 The question remains, of course, as to what can properly replace such sentences as I am
tired, a topic to which we will return when we come to assess Advaita Vedanta’s claims.
18 Jain doctrine is classically expressed in the Jaina Sutras. Jain tradition is doctrinally far
more homogeneous than Buddhist tradition.
19 Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, chapter V, sections 29, 30, 31, 38, 41, 42; Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore (eds), A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy