NOTES 375(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 256. The Sourcebook is probably
still the most accessible source for the passages that it contains.
20 Ibid., chapter II, sections 7, 8, 29; Sourcebook, p. 254.
21 This is a Jain analogue of the doctrine of double predestination (some to salvation,
some to damnation), albeit without a predestinator.
22 Samayasdra, 325.
23 Atmanusasna, 174.
24 Ibid., chapter X, section 4; Sourcebook, p. 260.
25 Herman Jacobi, trans., Jaina Sutras (New York: Dover Publications, 1962; originally
published, 1896) I, 264.
26 Buddhist tradition is far less homogeneous than Jain tradition. While the doctrines
that, nirvana aside, nothing is permanent, everything is momentary, and the related
thesis that no momentary thing exists independently, come near to being Buddhist
orthodoxy, even within Indian Buddhism there is significant doctrinal variety. My
focus here is on Theravada Buddhism. The same issues arise for non-Absolutist
Mahayana traditions. Absolutist Mahayana tradition is a philosophical sibling, if not
twin, to Advaita Vedanta and lies outside the present discussion.
27 Anguttara-nikaya, iii, 134; Sourcebook, pp. 273, 274; the text is Theravadin.
28 Visuddhi-magga, xviii; Sourcebook, pp. 284–5; the text is Theravadin.
29 Or, for Buddhist idealism, sensory contents of elements of simultaneous bundles.
30 Sanmati Tarka, 1.12; Sourcebook, p. 269.
31 Strictly, change requires that the item that changes retain numerical identity over
time. Whether this is a matter of permanence, in the sense of the inherent
indestructibility that Jainism ascribes to persons, or a beginningless but nonetheless
dependent numerical identity over time that persons enjoy according to Vsistaadvaita
and Dvaita, or a non-beginningless dependent numerical identity over time that persons
enjoy according to the Semitic monotheisms, is irrelevant here. I use the quoted term
“permanence” for convenience; let it stand in for something like “numerical identity
over time” of any of the sorts just mentioned.
32 For non-idealist Buddhism, there are bundles that contain no states of consciousness
(these being the referents of typical physical object terms) and bundles that contain
states of consciousness (these being the referents of typical person terms). For the
idealist Buddhist, there are only the latter, and typical physical object terms refer to
subsets of bundles of states of consciousness (those containing sensory content).
33 If metaphysical identity is necessary, a Buddhist person could not have lived lives
other than the one she did live. This raises questions about any alleged freedom such
a person could possess.
34 “Getting them right” of course involves more than being able to pass a true–false
exam in metaphysics. It involves deep convictions, basic and firmly held beliefs,
associated feelings and practices, and the like – “heart knowledge as well as head
knowledge” as some would say. But “getting them right” does include getting them
right – believing what is true.
35 I use “memory” here as a “success term” without denying that one can think one
remembers when one does not (a view quite open to Jainism). If one prefers, let him
for “memory” substitute “reliable memory.”
36 If you want to think of various reincarnation “visits” as all comprising a single lifetime,
think of the actions as having been done on earlier “visits” than those in which the
recompense comes.
37 The role alleged ineffability plays in this notion will be discussed in a later chapter.