91172.pdf

7 Court and the Legal System—Civil Forensics

Gina Hampton is a 27-year-old musician in a large metropolitan area. Gina has

a history of mental instability, with diagnoses of narcissistic and antisocial personality

disorders as well as severe depression and occasional suicidal ideation. Recently, she was

exposed to several stressful events, including the death of a close friend and the break-up

of a 5-year relationship. Her friends and family have noticed her mental state worsening

over the past few weeks and tear that she may present a danger to herself or those around

her. Some suggest that she be placed in a psychiatric hospital for further observation. Gina,

however, insists that she is "fine" and resists any attempt at psychological intervention.

Unconvinced, her friends and family wonder under which conditions Gina may be

hospitalized against her will, as they feel it would be in her best interest at this time. The

involuntary hospitalization of Gina, however, requires a finding that she is "mentally ill'

and presents a clanger. Given that she has recently engaged in several dangerous behaviors,

jeopardizing her own safety as well as that of others, the primary question is whether she

is "mentally ill" in the eves of the law.

Literature Review

Civil Commitment

The first substantive criterion for civil commitment is the presence of a mental
impairment. Most jurisdictions define this as the existence of a "mental illness" or
a demonstration that the individual is suffering from a "mental disorder" (Reisner
& Slobogin, 1990). Consistent with basic due process, the Court has held that
an individual who is not mentally ill cannot be involuntarily committed for civil
purposes (see Foucha u Louisiana, 1992). Since the existence of mental illness is
a necessary prerequisite for civil commitment, the primary interest is then in the
constitution of mental illness. What exactly must be found if an individual is to be
hospitalized against his or her will?
Despite the involuntary commitment reform movements of the 1970s contesting
that mental illness is a "bankrupt term easily manipulated" (Melton et al, 1987,
p. 217), many legislative attempts to define and operationalize the term create only
vague and circular meanings (see Levy & Rubenstem, 1996; Melton et al., 1987).
The law has imposed only minimal limitations on the term, often using broad and
general definitions (B. Winick, 1995). Melton ct al. (1987) cite one of the most
specific of legislative attempts to define mental illness as:

"Mental illness" means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orienta-

tion or memory, any of which grossly impairs judgement, behavior, capacity to recognize

reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life, but shall not include mental re-

tardation, (p. 221)

Such a proposal is far more precise than another statute, which reads, "a men-
tally ill person means a person whose mental health is substantially impaired"
(Melton et al., 1987, p. 221). It is, however, still controversial, as it relies on equally
vague terms such as "substantial," "grossly impaired," and "ordinary demands of
life." Many statutes have, however, attained some degree of success by excluding