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Connecticut, for example, between 1970 and 1972, 40% of insanity acquittals were
classified as "personality disorders" (APA, 1983). Thus, the definition of mental
disease or defect for purposes of insanity defenses varies from state to state and is
probably more broadly defined than some have suggested.


Foucha v, Louisiana


The Supreme Court shed some light on the meaning of mental illness in the
case Foucha v. Louisiana (1992). While the case considered the extent to which
an individual could be confined after being found NGR.I, it has some important
implications tor the meaning of mental illness in civil commitment and insanity
defense matters. The Court held that it would be unconstitutional to detain an
individual who was diagnosed only with antisocial personality disorder. The primary
issue was whether it was constitutional to continue to detain an individual who had
been acquitted but had recovered from his or her illness. The short answer from
the Court was "no." The more relevant issue, however, is the meaning of "mental
illness." While for purposes of involuntary commitment an individual must be
shown to be mentally ill and dangerous, the Foucha v. Louisiana case found that
dangerousness and antisocial personality disorder were not sufficient. Thus, the
implication is that personality disorders, at least antisocial personality disorder, do
not constitute mental illness for purposes of involuntary confinement. The Court
did not justify this finding, leaving the issue still unresolved. Thus, the impact of
the Court's decision in Foucha may be more apparent in future decisions.


Forensic Psychology and Policy Implications


The longstanding failure of the legislature and the courts to adequately define
"mental illness" leaves a number of issues for forensic psychological analysts and
practitioners. Most importantly, it leaves the decisions as to what constitutes mental
illness and who is mentally ill to the attending forensic examiner. Regardless of the
specific (or general) reasons arguing tor or against psychology's involvement in the
courtroom, its "expertise" is judged central to civil commitment and mental illness
affairs. Thus, the /^/meaning of mental illness has been "passed on" by the courts,
only to be adopted by the "expert(s)" attending to the particular circumstances
of individual cases (i.e., the treatment team) (Arrigo, 1993). In all likelihood this
will continue. Thus, the meaning of mental illness becomes a significant issue for
forensic psychologists above all else.
Despite the disagreement among mental health professionals defining what men-
tal illness is, the legal system finds it appropriate to leave the decision in the hands of
a select few individuals in the mental health and/or medical field. The individuals
who are part of this defining, then, would differ depending on the case in question.

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