212 • CHAPTER 8 Everyday Memory and Memory Errors
(0.33; ● Figure 8.9a). A particularly striking
difference between memory for the two events
was that whereas all of the participants had
no trouble remembering 9/11, only 65 percent
of the participants were able to remember
what the everyday event was, even after being
prompted with a cue (Figure 8.9b).
The results of both the Talarico and Rubin
(2003) and Davidson and coworkers (2006)
experiments showed that memory for the fl ash-
bulb event declined over time. These results
support the idea that a “fl ashbulb memory”
is not like a photograph. However, Davidson
and coworkers’ participants found it more dif-
fi cult to remember their everyday event. It is
not clear why this occurred, but possible rea-
sons are that Davidson’s participants were not
aware they would be tested later (the 1-year
test was a surprise) and the retrieval cues they
were given may not have been as effective as those provided to Talarico and Rubin’s
participants.
We can understand why the retrieval cues may have differed in effectiveness by
returning to the results of Timo Mantyla’s experiment that we described in Chapter 7
(page 183). The results of that experiment showed that retrieval cues are more effective
when they are created by the participant than when they are created by someone else.
The fact that Talarico and Rubin’s participants created their own retrieval cues, whereas
Davidson’s participants did not, may explain why Davidson’s participants remembered
less about their everyday events, and why the results of this experiment demonstrated a
large difference in the memories associated with fl ashbulb and everyday events.
Better memory for 9/11 is probably due to two characteristics of memories surround-
ing fl ashbulb events. First, they involve high emotions. Most people associate fi nding out
about 9/11 not just with the event itself but also with intense emotions such as surprise,
disbelief, anger, and fear. We know that high emotions trigger responses in the amygdala
that are associated with better memory for emotional events (see page 208). It would not
be surprising, therefore, if memory for hearing about fl ashbulb events was somewhat
better than memory for less emotional, “everyday” events (Davidson & Glisky, 2002).
A second factor that can potentially enhance memory for fl ashbulb events is added
rehearsal. Ulric Neisser and coworkers (1996) argue we may remember events like those
that happened on 9/11 not because of a special mechanism, but because we rehearse
these events after they occur. This idea is called the narrative rehearsal hypothesis.
The narrative rehearsal hypothesis makes sense when we consider the events
that followed 9/11. Pictures of the planes crashing into the World Trade Center were
replayed endlessly on TV, and the event and its aftermath were covered extensively for
months afterwards in the media. Neisser argues that if rehearsal is the reason for our
memories of signifi cant events, then the “fl ashbulb” analogy is misleading. Remember
that the memory we are concerned with is the characteristics surrounding how you fi rst
heard about 9/11, but much of the “rehearsal” associated with this event was rehearsal
for events that occurred after hearing about it. Seeing TV replays of the planes crashing
into the towers, for example, might result in people focusing more on that than on who
told them about the event or where they were. This would explain the intrusion of the
TV errors that occurred in the Challenger study.
This effect of rehearsal through watching TV coverage of an event is also illus-
trated by the media coverage following the death of Michael Jackson on June 25, 2009.
Although as I write this it is only a little over a month since this event happened, I have
seen, read, and heard so much about Michael Jackson that it is diffi cult to sort out
when I fi rst heard about the event from all of my other exposure to it.
The exact mechanism responsible for memory of fl ashbulb events is still being dis-
cussed by memory researchers (Berntsen, 2009; Luminet & Curci, 2009; Talarico &9/11 Everyday
eventEveryday
eventCongruence score1.000.51005000(a)9/11Percentage rememberinganything about the event(b)●FIGURE 8.9 Results of Davidson et al.’s (2006) fl ashbulb memory experiment.
(a) Congruence score for 9/11 memories and memories for the everyday event,
measured 1 year after the events. (b) Percent of participants who were able to
remember at least something about the 9/11 and everyday events. Note that
35 percent of the participants could not remember anything about the everyday
event. (Based on data from Davidson et al., 2006, and personal communication.)Copyright 2011 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part.