Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience, 3rd Edition

Representing Relationships Between Categories: Semantic Networks • 253

CRITICISM OF THE COLLINS AND QUILLIAN MODEL

Although Collins and Quillian’s model was supported by the results of a

number of experiments, such as their reaction time experiment (Figure 9.14)

and Meyer and Schvaneveldt’s priming experiment, it didn’t take long for

other researchers to call the theory into question. They pointed out that the

theory couldn’t explain the typicality effect, in which reaction times for state-

ments about an object are faster for more typical members of a category than

for less typical members (see page 244; Rips et al., 1973). Thus, the statement

“A canary is a bird” is verifi ed more quickly than “An ostrich is a bird,” but

the model predicts equally fast reaction times because “canary” and “ostrich”

are both one node away from “bird.”

Researchers also questioned the concept of cognitive economy because

of evidence that people may, in fact, store specifi c properties of concepts (like

“has wings” for “canary”) right at the node for that concept (Conrad, 1972).

In addition, Lance Rips and coworkers (1973) obtained sentence verifi cation

results such as the following:

• A pig is a mammal. RT = 1,476 ms


• A pig is an animal. RT = 1,268 ms

“A pig is an animal” is verifi ed more quickly, but

as we can see from the network in ● Figure 9.18,

the Collins and Quillian model predicts that “A

pig is a mammal” should be verifi ed more quickly

because a link leads directly from “pig” to “mam-

mal,” but we need to travel one link past the mam-

mal node to get to “animal.” Sentence verifi cation

results such as these, plus the other criticisms

of the theory, led Collins and Elizabeth Loftus

(1975) to propose a new semantic network model

designed to handle the results that the Collins and

Quillian model couldn’t explain.

THE COLLINS AND LOFTUS MODEL:

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AFFECTS

NETWORKS

Collins and Loftus (1975) proposed a model that

resulted in networks like the one in ● Figure 9.19,

in which concepts that are more closely related

are connected by shorter lines. For example, the

network in Figure 9.19 indicates that “vehicle” is

connected to “car,” “truck,” and “bus” by short

links (because these are closely related concepts),

but is connected to “fi re engine” and “ambulance”

(which are less typical vehicles than car, truck, or

bus) by longer links. These shorter links predict

faster reaction times for the more typical vehicles.

The Collins and Loftus model abandons the

hierarchical structure used by Collins and Quillian in

favor of a structure based on a person’s experience.

This means that the spacing between various con-

cepts can differ for various people depending on their

experience and knowledge about specifi c concepts.

In addition to proposing experientially based

links between concepts, Collins and Loftus also

● FIGURE 9.18 Semantic network that
shows that “pig” is closer to “mammal” than
to “animal.”

Animal

Salmon Pig

Fish Mammal

Canary

Bird

● FIGURE 9.19 Semantic network proposed by Collins and Loftus (1975).
(Source: A. M. Collins & E. F. Loftus, “A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing,”
Psychological Review, 82, 407–428, Fig. 1. Copyright © 1975 with permission from the
American Psychological Association.)

Street

Ambulance

Car

Vehicle

Truck

Bus

Fire

engine

Apples

Pears

Cherries

Sunsets

Sunrises Clouds

Flowers

Violets Roses

Yellow

Green

Orange Fire

House

Red

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